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TITLE:  A SOM+ DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM FOR NETWORK INTRUSION 
DETECTION 
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Shahram Rahimi 
 
 This research created a new theoretical Soft Computing (SC) hybridized 
network intrusion detection diagnostic system including complex hybridization of 
a 3D full color Self-Organizing Map (SOM), Artificial  Immune System Danger 
Theory (AISDT), and a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS). This SOM+ diagnostic 
archetype includes newly defined intrusion types to facilitate diagnostic analysis, 
a descriptive computational model, and an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge 
(IMNB) to collect data, while maintaining compatibility with traditional packet 
analysis.  This system is modular, multitaskable, scalable, intuitive, adaptable to 
quickly changing scenarios, and uses relatively few resources. 
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CHAPTER 1-- INTRODUCTION 
The widespread need for improved network intrusion detection is clear.  A 
recent United States Air Force manual, for example, emphasizes, ―The United 
States is vulnerable to cyberspace attacks by relentless adversaries attempting 
to infiltrate our networks at work and at home – millions of times a day, 24/7.‖ [1] 
(US Air Force 2010) Computer intrusions are pervasive in our networking and 
have easily cost billions of dollars of resources in recent years considering the 
lost time of users continually updating operating systems and other software, the 
cost of hiring information security teams, the lost time of rebuilding computer 
operating systems after they have become infected, and the cost of the recovery 
processes of individuals whose identities have been stolen. 
Information security is a complex and inexact process involving devious 
malignant people with a broad range of skills from technical to social engineering.  
Intrusion detection involves subterfuge and many deceptions and spoofs where 
things are not as they appear to be.  Even security officers can be disgruntled 
employees posing insider threats.  This complexity and ambiguity involved with 
intrusion detection leads to Soft Computing for solutions. 
This research represents six years of studying network intrusion detection, 
progressing from traditional packet and log analysis to general Soft Computing 
methods, and, then, specifically, to create, implement, test, and evaluate a new 
theoretical Soft Computing (SC) hybridized network intrusion detection diagnostic 
system to project Self Organizing Map (SOM) output to a 3D full color visual 
display and process this output through a second layer Fuzzy Inference System 
2 
 
 
(FIS) to better interpret the results. Artificial Immune System Danger Theory 
(AISDT) was studied to see if this could be hybridized with the SOM. This SOM+ 
diagnostic archetype included an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) to 
collect data, a descriptive intrusion detection computational model to describe the 
methodology, and newly defined intrusion types to facilitate diagnostic analysis of 
results, while maintaining compatibility with traditional packet analysis.  The goals 
for this system included being modular, multitaskable, scalable, intuitive, and 
adaptable to quickly changing scenarios while using relatively few resources. 
While Soft Computing methods have been researched in intrusion 
detection, several theoretical ideas of this research are new: the 3D full color 
SOM visual display with the hybridized FIS and AISDT, the Invisible Mobile 
Network Bridge (IMNB) for data collection and monitoring, the intrusion detection 
computational model, and the newly defined intrusion types. All of these novel 
theories together form a cohesive new diagnostic system for intrusion detection. 
This ID diagnostic system is based on a medical center metaphor: medical 
diagnosis is based on a multitude of possible analytical tests such as x-rays, CAT 
scans, urine tests, and blood tests. Various medical tests are often used and a 
diagnosis is typically based on a fusion of multiple test results. Likewise with 
network intrusion detection, multiple analytical methods are needed with 
analytical methods to fuse the results. 
This research originated with creation of ANNaBell, a SOM Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) placed into production which has successfully detected 
feral malware, including Storm Worm bot infections. A SOM is a type of Artificial 
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Neural Network (ANN), and ANNaBell is named for being an ANN that rings a 
bell (sends an alert) when malware is detected. ANNaBell discovered an infected 
computer on March 29, 2008, being the first known time that a self-trained 
computational intelligence has discovered previously unknown feral malicious 
software. ANNaBell first discovered a Storm Worm infected computer on August 
12, 2008, and was still in production as this was written approximately three 
years later. 
This research redoubles capabilities of computational intelligence for 
intrusion detection for malware not previously known. Traditional packet analysis 
intrusion detection is stymied by the continuously evolving command and control 
network traffic. This diagnostic model assists in overcoming this barrier by using 
Internet traffic recorded by an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) to indicate 
locally infected computers. This research concerns the analysis of 
multidimensional data. One of the advantages of this methodology is the 
representation of multidimensional data into a smaller dimensional space. A 
meta-hexagonal map mitigates the so-called curse of dimensionality by labeling 
complex data areas with simple explanatory names such as green zone and red 
zone to help further visualize the data. 
Chapter 2 provides background, review of the literature, and state of the 
art information for initial components of this research including types of intrusion 
detection, data preparation, feature reduction, clustering and classification, the 
intrusion detection problem, and the use of Soft Computing methods in intrusion 
detection.  Chapter 3 covers the early methodology and development of 
4 
 
 
components of this research including Local Landline Network Intrusion 
Detection System (LLNIDS) Types of Intrusion Detection, the LLNIDS 
Computational Model, and the design of the LLNIDS Hybrid used in this research 
including the Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB), the SOM component, the 
FIS component, the Svensson and Josang (SJ) Fusion component, and the AIS 
Danger Theory component.  Chapter 4 continues with the implementation and 
results of the hybridized SOM/FIS/AISDT aspects of the system, including new 
dynamic procedures.  Chapter 5 discusses the significance of this research, and 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2—BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
This research proposes a nearly complete overhaul of how intrusion 
detection research is viewed and accomplished from types, to a data 
computational model, Soft Computing methods, and an overall diagnostic 
system.  This chapter provides background, review of the literature, and state of 
the art information for each of the initial issues of this research, including types of 
intrusion detection, data preparation, feature reduction, clustering and 
classification, the intrusion detection problem, and Soft Computing intrusion 
detection methods including Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), Fuzzy inference 
Systems (FIS), and Artificial Immune Systems Danger Theory (AISDT).  No other 
known work covers a similar comprehensive diagnostic system for intrusion 
detection. 
TYPES OF INTRUSION DETECTION 
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and responding to 
malicious activity targeted at computing and networking sources [2].  Over the 
years, types of intrusion detection have been labeled in various linguistic terms, 
with often vague or overlapping meanings.  Not all researchers have used the 
same labels with the same meanings.   To demonstrate the need for consistent 
labeling of intrusion types, previous types of intrusion detection are listed below 
in order to show the variety of types of labeling that have been used in the past. 
Denning [3] in 1986 referred to intrusion detection methods which included 
profiles, anomalies, and rules.  Her profiling included metrics and statistical 
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models.  She referred to misuse in terms of insiders who misused privileges. 
Young in 1987 [4] defined two types of monitors:  appearance monitors 
and behavior monitors, the first performing static analysis of systems to detect 
anomalies and the second examining behavior. 
Lunt [5] in 1988 referred to the misuse of insiders; the finding of abnormal 
behavior by determining departures from historically established norms of 
behavior; a priori rules; and using expert system technology to codify rules 
obtained from system security officers.  A year later, in 1989, Lunt mentioned 
knowledge-based, statistical, and rule-based intrusion detection.  In 1993, she 
referred to model-based reasoning [6]. 
Vaccaro and Liepins [7] in 1989 stated that misuse manifests itself as 
anomalous behavior.  Hellman, Liepins, and Richards [8] in 1992 stated that 
computer use is either normal or misuse.  Denault, et al, [9] in 1994 referred to 
detection-by-appearance and detection-by-behavior.  Forrest, et al, [10] in 1994 
said there were three types:  activity monitors, signature scanners, and file 
authentication programs. 
Intrusion detection types began converging on two main types in 1994:  
misuse and anomaly.  Crosbie and Spafford [11] defined misuse detection as 
watching for certain actions being performed on certain objects.  They defined 
anomaly detection as deviations from normal system usage patterns.  Kumar and 
Spafford [12] also referred to anomaly and misuse detection in 1994.  Many other 
researchers, too numerous to mention them all, have also referred to misuse and 
anomaly as the two main types of intrusion detection, from 1994 up to the 
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present time. 
However, other types of intrusion detection continue to be mentioned.  
Ilgun, Kemmerer, and Porras [13] in 1995 referred to four types:  Threshold, 
anomaly, rule-based, and model-based.  Esmaili, Safavi-Naini, and Pieprzyk [14] 
in 1996 said the two main methods are statistical and rule-based expert systems.   
Debar, Dacier, and Wespi, [15] in 1999 referred to two complementary 
trends:  (1) The search for evidence based on knowledge; and, (2) the search for 
deviations from a model of unusual behavior based on observations of a system 
during a known normal state.  The first they referred to as misuse detection, 
detection by appearance, or knowledge-based.  The second they referred to as 
anomaly detection or detection by behavior. 
Bace [16] in 2000 described misuse detection as looking for something 
bad and anomaly detection as looking for something rare or unusual.  Marin-
Blazquez and Perez [17] in 2008 said that there are three main approaches:  
signature, anomaly, and misuse detection. 
While descriptive, these various labels over time are inconsistent and do 
not favor an analytical discussion of network intrusion detection.  Not all of them 
are necessary, they are not mutually exclusive, and as individual groups they 
have not been demonstrated as being complete.  Rather than arbitrate which of 
these labels should be used and how they should be defined, new labels have 
been created to describe types of local network intrusion detection in a manner 
which favors an analytical environment.  These new types are explained in the 
Methodology section of this paper. 
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DATA PREPARATION 
Data selection begins with manual feature selection and many strategies 
have been used.  Lunt‘s [18] features included bad login attempts, amount of 
network activity by type and host, and number of times each account was 
accessed.  Cannady [19] used the protocol, source port, destination port, source 
address, destination address, ICMP type, ICMP code, data length, and raw data. 
A standardized vector of 41 elements resulted from a data set produced in 
1998 by MIT‘s Lincoln Laboratory under DARPA sponsorship and was listed by 
Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood [20]:  duration of the connection, 
protocol, service, flag, source bytes, destination bytes, land, wrong fragment, 
urgent, hot, failed logins, logged in, number of compromised conditions, root 
shell, su attempted, number of root accesses, number of file creation operations, 
number of shell prompts, number of operations on access control files, number of 
outbound commands in an ftp session, is hot login, is guest login, count of 
connections, service count, SYN errors, service SYN errors, REJ errors, service 
REJ errors, same service rate, different service rate, percent of connections to 
different hosts, count of connections with same destination host, count of 
connections with same host and service, percent of connections having the same 
destination host and service, percent of different services on same host, percent 
of connections to the host having the same source port, percent of connections 
to the same service coming from different hosts, percent of SO errors for host, 
percent of SO errors for host and service, percent of RST errors for host, and 
percent of RST errors for host and service.  See that paper for more detailed 
information on these features. 
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Lee and Heinbuch [21] in 2001 experimented with SYNs received, SYNs 
dropped, SYN-ACKs sent, number of new connections made, number of queued 
SYNs at end of the last window, number of queued SYNs at end of this window, 
queued SYNs timed out, maximum number of connections open, FIN-ACKs sent, 
FIN-ACKs received, resets sent, resets received, number of connections closed, 
number of source sockets for received data packets, number of destination 
sockets for sent packets, number of destination ports for received packets, and 
number of source ports for sent packets. 
Mukkamala, Janoski, and Sung [22] in 2001 assigned weights to 
commands, such as 1 to exit and 10 to chown, and determined the average and 
highest weight for a user.  Web related data was also examined, such as the 
number of 404 errors. 
Term frequency inverse document frequency (tf-idf) for text categorization 
in relation to intrusion detection was discussed by Zhang and Shen [23] in 2005. 
LaRoche and Zincir-Heywood [24] in 2006 presented a vector for wireless 
intrusion detection consisting of the subtype of the frame, the destination 
address, the sender address, the BSSID of the access point, the fragment 
number, the sequence number, and the channel. 
Livadas et al. [25] in 2006 added network information such as the 
maximum initial congestion window, who initiated the flow, percentage of packets 
pushed in a flow, variance of packet inter-arrival time for flow, and variance of 
bytes-per-packet for flow. 
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FEATURE REDUCTION 
Feature reduction means to reduce the amount of input data in order to 
reduce the resources needed for analysis.  It can also be called feature selection 
and feature ranking.  The original feature reduction must be done by a 
knowledge engineer who determines what the first input data is going to be from 
the possibly huge amount of data that is available.  The data can be 
computationally reduced later, usually in reference to reducing the number of 
elements in an input vector.  Feature reduction is needed especially for Soft 
Computing methods because they typically access the data repeatedly, such as 
during a training process, and using a full data set can be computationally 
prohibitive. 
Mukkamala, Sung, and Abraham in 2004 [26] explained that a complete 
analysis of feature ranking would require    experiments to examine all 
possibilities, analyzing two variables at a time, then three variables at a time, 
etc., and would still not be infallible because the available data might be of poor 
quality. 
Mukkamala and Sung in 2002 [27] proposed this feature reduction 
algorithm which was implemented after an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) was 
trained: 
1. Delete one input feature from the (training and testing) data. 
2. Use the resultant data set for training and testing the classier. 
3. Analyze the results of the classier, using the performance metrics. 
4. Rank the importance of the feature according to the rules. 
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5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 for each of the input features. 
Using OA for Overall Accuracy, FP for False Positive rate, and FN for 
False Negative rate, these are the rules which were used to rank the importance 
of the features: 
1. If OA increases and FP decreases and FN decreases, then the 
feature is unimportant. 
2. If OA increases and FP increases and FN decreases, then the 
feature is unimportant. 
3. If OA decreases and FP increases and FN increases, then the 
feature is important. 
4. If OA decreases and FP decreases and FN increases, then the 
feature is important. 
5. If OA does not change and FP does not change then the feature 
is secondary. 
Sung and Mukkamala in 2003) [28] identified features with Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) and ANN.  Abraham and Jain in 2004 [29] based feature 
reduction on the contribution the input variables made to the construction of a 
decision tree. 
Chen, Abraham, and Yang in 2005 [30] proposed a Flexible Neural Tree 
(FNT) for feature reduction following this mechanism: 
1. Initially the input variables are selected to formulate the FNT 
model with same probabilities. 
2. The variables which have more contribution to the objective 
12 
 
 
function will be enhanced and have high opportunity to survive in 
the next generation by an evolutionary procedure 
3. The evolutionary operators provide an input selection method by 
which the FNT should select appropriate variables automatically. 
An evolutionary feature reduction method was proposed by Chimphlee et 
al. in 2005 [31] which was followed by fuzzy clustering. 
CLUSTERING VS. CLASSIFICATION 
Clustering is the unsupervised division of unlabeled sets into subsets, and 
classification is the supervised determination of the labeled subset to which an 
element belongs.  In intrusion detection, for example, clustering would ideally 
consist of the unsupervised dividing of all computer usage into subsets which 
would put intrusions into some subsets and normal traffic into other subsets. 
Classification would then be the determination of which subset some new 
computer usage belongs:  intrusion or normal. 
Clustering can be done by Evolutionary Computing (EC), Fuzzy 
Reasoning, Swarm Intelligence, and Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), as well as by 
other methods. SOM generally both clusters data and also classifies it. Other 
Soft Computing methods generally classify. 
Newsome, Karp, and Song in 2006 [32] explained how to thwart clustering 
and classification:  1) inseparability attacks to blur distinctions between classes; 
and, 2) red herring attacks to create false classifications. 
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THE INTRUSION DETECTION PROBLEM 
Intrusion Detection on a high level is an intractable problem with some 
aspects of it being unsolvable.  This has been proven and illustrated many ways.   
Cohen noted in 1987 [33] (Page 31) that the determination of a virus was 
undecidable: ―In order to determine that a program 'P' is a virus, it must be 
determined that P infects other programs.  This is undecidable since P could 
invoke the decision procedure 'D' and infect other programs if and only if D 
determines that P is not a virus.‖ He also noted that tracing exact information flow 
requires NP-Complete time.  Cohen listed these specific problems as being 
undecidable: 
 Detection of a virus by its appearance 
 Detection of a virus by its behavior 
 Detection of an evolution of a known virus 
 Detection of a triggering mechanism by its appearance 
 Detection of a triggering mechanism by its behavior 
 Detection of an evolution of a known triggering device 
 Detection of a virus detector by its appearance 
 Detection of a viral detector by its behavior 
 Detection of an evolution of a known viral detection 
Other researchers have confirmed the difficulty of the problem. Using 
misuse to mean all kinds of badness with a scale of 0 (normal) to 1 (misuse), 
Helman, Liepins, and Richards in 1992 [8] showed that expert systems are NP-
Hard.  Me in 1998 [34] used a genetic algorithm to manipulate vectors based on 
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event counts, and said the problem was NP Complete. 
These researchers described it linguistically.  (Intrusion Detection) Rules 
need to be maintained and managed.  This process is labor-intensive and error-
prone. [35]  Signature-based network intrusion-detection systems (NIDS) often 
report a massive number of simple alerts of low-level security-related events. [36] 
(Page 1)  It is common for a NIDS (Network IDS) to raise thousands of alerts per 
day, most of which are false alerts. [37] (Page 1) 
Here are some more colorful ways of illustrating the intrusion detection 
problem.  It is an arms race where one side advances and then the other side 
advances, ad infinitum.  It is a treadmill where the researcher figures out a way to 
detect the latest kind of intrusion, the intrusion changes, and the researcher does 
it again, ad infinitum.  As a general summary, a detection method can exist for 
every kind of intrusion and an intrusion method can exist for every kind of 
detection.  It is an evolutionary system where both sides continually evolve to 
outwit the other side.  Cohen [33] (Page 34) compared this situation to an old 
western saying:  ain’t a horse that can’t be rode, ain’t a man that can’t be 
throwed. 
SOFT COMPUTING AND INTRUSION DETECTION 
One of Cohen‘s [33] (Page 30) conclusions from the intrusion detection 
problem above was this leaves us with imprecise techniques.  This overall 
difficulty with intrusion detection leads to Soft Computing for solutions.  Although 
the proper term Soft Computing was initiated by Zadeh in the early 1990‘s [38], 
some components of Soft Computing are much older:  Bayes probability was 
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published in 1763 [39]; Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) was published in 1943 
[40]; and, Fuzzy Sets was published in 1965 [41].  Soft Computing is called soft 
in order to contrast it with hard computing, i.e., exactness.  Some characteristics 
of Soft Computing include probability, randomness, inexactness, and biological 
attributes.  Soft Computing has similarities with Artificial Intelligence (AI), but AI 
researchers have traditionally used hard computing.  An additional occasional 
characteristic of Soft Computing is emergence [42].  Many refer to this 
characteristic as being a Black Box, described as a device where something 
goes in and something comes out, but what happens inside the box cannot be 
seen.  Soft Computing is not really a Black Box---researchers write the software 
code for it and know exactly what is inside the box.  However, results emerge 
from this code in ways which often cannot be readily understood.  The graphical 
SOM map in this research addresses that problem.  Other characteristics of Soft 
Computing are tractability, robustness, low solution cost, and tolerance for 
imprecision and uncertainty [43].  Soft Computing has been further described as 
―aimed at an accommodation with the pervasive imprecision of the real world‖, as 
well as to ―exploit the tolerance for imprecision, uncertainty and partial truth to 
achieve tractability, robustness, low solution cost and better rapport with reality‖, 
and ―the role model for Soft Computing is the human mind‖ [44] (Page 1). 
These characteristics of Soft Computing are summarized here as being 
the Imprecision Principle:   
Some labor intensive, error-prone, biological, evolutionary, 
incomplete, inconsistent, impossible, un-scalable, unsolvable, 
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undecidable, complex, ambiguous, non-intuitive, and/or intractable 
problems are best resolved with imprecise, probabilistic, fuzzy, 
inexact, emergent, non-intuitive, uncertain, and partially true 
methods which are designed largely by the intuition, judgment, and 
experience of knowledge engineers. 
Billions of network packets are continually being created on the Internet 
and it is impossible for the network security analyst to know the reason for every 
single one of these packets being sent by routers, switches, appliances, 
programs, and users from all over the world.  This network traffic, from an 
analyst‘s point of view, contains imprecision, uncertainty, and partial truths, 
meaning that decisions must routinely be made from incomplete information.  
Soft Computing thus provides a coping mechanism for network security tasks 
that otherwise would be impossible. 
Extensive research has been done on using Soft Computing for intrusion 
detection and [45] examines the state of the art in this field.  Ten general Soft 
Computing components stand out in intrusion detection research:  Artificial 
Immune Systems (AIS), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Bayes Reasoning, 
Decision Trees (DT), Dempster-Shafer (D-S), Evolutionary Computing (EC), 
Fuzzy reasoning, Hidden Markov Model (HMM), Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), 
and Swarm Intelligence. 
Soft Computing generally refers to the hybridization of these components, 
for example ANN with Fuzzy.  Three general types of hybridization are possible:  
consecutive, ensemble, and interactive. 
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Figure 1, Types of Hybridization 
Figure 1 illustrates three types of hybridization.  The first type is 
consecutive in which the output of one method is the input of the next method.  
This can continue in a series larger than two methods.  The second type of 
hybridization is ensemble in which two or more methods are implemented in 
parallel and the results are fused.  The third type of hybridization is interactive in 
which two or more methods interact with each other in some way, such as a loop, 
before they produce a single output.  Complex hybridizations with combinations 
of these types are also possible. 
These methods of data fusion have been researched for ensemble 
hybridization.  Averaging, voting, or using the maximum value was suggested by 
[22].  A positive result if any of the interim results is positive [46].  These methods 
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were proposed by [47]:  Bayes Average, Bayes Product, Dempster-Shafer, 
Recognition, Substitution, and Rejection Rates (RSR), the Predictive Rate 
Method (PRM), and Rogova‘s Class Level Method.  This method was proposed 
by [48] for four interim results:  Let the four interim results be                  for 
each of the four parallel methods.  Then, let    be the final result which is to be 
determined.  Find    such that                                 is 
minimized.  Although not called fusion, a subjective logic method of correlation of 
intrusion alarms was explained by [49] and the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) 
fuses a series of four inputs into a contextual output [50]. 
 
Figure 2, Complex Hybridization 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of complex hybridization.  The overall 
layout is an ensemble which consists of consecutive methods 1 and 2, Method 3, 
and interactive methods 4 and 5.  The three interim results in Figure 2 are fused 
for a single output.  The complex nature of intrusion detection favors hybridized 
methods because a single method cannot cover all of the possibilities and 
intricacies involved in discovering all kinds of intrusion attempts. 
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A study of existing Soft Computing intrusion detection strategies was 
published in [45].  Numerous examples of hybridized combinations of methods 
were noted in this paper, but comprehensive direct comparisons of methods are 
not feasible because of the many different kinds of intrusions, criteria, and 
variables which were used in setting up test environments.  Not all researchers 
used the same variations of methods—many different types of ANN were 
evaluated, for example.  The statistical relevance of the results of the 
comparisons is not known.  One clear winner in testing, though, was the 
ensemble hybridization method [51] because it can use diverse approaches in 
parallel.  Compare this with medical tests in which the patient might get blood 
tests, an electrocardiogram, x-rays, and a urinalysis in parallel with the results 
from these tests all going to a physician who fuses the data into a diagnosis. 
Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) 
The research for this paper began as an experiment with SOM to see if it 
would cluster Storm Worm intrusions from firewall logs.  The experiment was 
successful and was published in [52] and [53], (see for details).  This SOM was 
later called 1D ANNaBell, for a one dimensional ANN that rang a bell for alerts.  
A SOM is a type of Artificial Neural Network (ANN), but the structure of a SOM is 
significantly different from a feed forward and back propagation ANN.  Both have 
nodes (neurons), but in a classical ANN the nodes are connected in such a way 
that data are manipulated while conceptually flowing through the node structure 
resulting in an answer, whereas in a SOM the nodes represent clusters in space 
which are conceptually pulled like rubber over the data, which can result in a 
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representational visual display of the data.  The original ANN was created by 
McCulloch and Pitts in 1943 [40].  SOM was conceived by Kohonen in 1982 [54] 
and is sometimes called a Kohonen Network.  A SOM can represent 
multidimensional data in a smaller dimensional space, like shining light on a 
three-dimensional object to create a two-dimensional shadow.  Hexagonal SOM 
maps have been used to display high dimensional data in a more human 
understandable format. 
A SOM primarily clusters the data, but it can also classify data by finding 
the nearest node in space, called the Best Matching Node (BMN).  A visual 
display can be produced, but is not always necessary.  The visual display for 1D 
ANNaBell is not very useful, but the node data of 1D ANNaBell can be used by 
scripts to produce intrusion detection alerts.  The graphics were improved with a 
newer version called 3D ANNaBell which was published in [55], [56], and [57], 
which see for detailed information. 
Other researchers have also studied SOM for intrusion detection.  
Hoglund and Hatonen in 1998 [58] constructed a SOM prototype for visualization 
of anomaly detection with a hex map based on user account logs (CPU times, 
characters transmitted, and blocks read).  A grey-scale U-matrix scheme showed 
the relative distances between the nodes and highlighted the clusters of data.  
(See Ultsch and Siemon [59] for a description of U-matrix.) 
Lichodzijewski, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood in 2002 [60] described how 
to do a hierarchy SOM with time series data, and Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood, and 
Heywood in 2003 [61] created a hierarchical hex SOM with TCP data. A 475-
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node SOM was produced by Ramadas, Ostermann, and Tjaden in 2003 [62] 
based on network traffic. 
Excellent demonstrative graphics were provided by Vicente and Vellido in 
2004 [63] for a growing hierarchical SOM; Tauriainen in 2005 [64] described a 
robust SOM for detecting P2P activity; and, Wetmore, Zincir-Heywood, and 
Heywood in 2005 [65] proposed dynamic subset selection in order to train SOMs 
much more quickly. 
Kayacik and Zincir-Heywood in 2006 [66] described a method of labeling 
nodes in a U-matrix hex map to clarify the meanings of resulting maps. 
Payl Over SOM for Intrusion DetectiON (POSEIDON) finessed an IDS by 
using SOM instead of payload length for preprocessing classification as 
explained by Bolzoni, Etalle, and Hartel in 2006 [67] and Bolzoni and Etalle in 
2008 [68]. 
Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) 
Fuzzy inference is a classifier that helps to cope with inexact descriptions 
of intrusions where the Imprecision Principle applies. Network indications of a 
P2P botnet might be, for example, that a local computer has contacts with a large 
number of external IP addresses, the packet size entropy is high, a wide range of 
destination ports is used with many high-numbered ports, and the UDP ratio is 
high. 
Luo in 2000 [69] refined an algorithm for mining fuzzy association rules, 
defined the concept of fuzzy frequency episodes, and presented an original 
algorithm for mining fuzzy frequency episodes, noting that security itself includes 
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fuzziness.  Degrees of attack guilt were outlined by Noel, Wijesekera, and 
Youman in 2002 [70] which can be used for Fuzzy inference: Absolute 
innocence, probable innocence, possible innocence, possible guilt, probable 
guilt, and provable guilt. 
Fuzzy IDS (FIDS) was proposed by Tillapart, Thumthawatworn, and 
Santiprabhob in 2002 [71] as a framework for network intrusions, including SYN 
and UDP floods, Ping of Death, E-mail Bomb, FTP and Telnet password 
guessing, and port scanning. Numerous example rules are provided in the paper. 
Cougarr-based IDS (CIDS) utilized a Fuzzy Inference System in the 
Decision Agent [72]. Cougarr stands for cognitive agent architecture and is open 
source software available at http://www.cougarr.org (8/2/2009). 
Rule-Based Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (RBFCM) were developed by Wang 
and Daniels in 2008 [73] to deal with causal relations for evidence graphs and 
hierarchical reasoning in network forensics. 
Su, Yu, and Lin in 2009 [74] proposed using fuzzy association rules for 
incremental mining so that a real-time IDS can be implemented with this method. 
In Association Based Classification (ABC), Tajbakhsh, Rahmati, and 
Mirzaei in 2009 [75] used fuzzy c-means for clustering and fuzzy association 
rules for classification. 
Artificial Immune Systems Danger Theory (AISDT) 
Using the generation of T cells in the Biological Immune System (BIS) as 
a basis for detecting computer viruses was proposed by [10] in 1994.  Strings 
were randomly generated, some of which matched protected data and 
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represented self.  Other strings did not match protected data and represented 
non-self.  The strings which matched protected data (self) were dropped, while 
the remaining strings were used somewhat like T cells and were compared with 
the protected data.  In a process called negative selection, a match of a non-self 
string with protected data indicated that a change in the protected data had 
occurred, indicating an intrusion.  This would later be called an Artificial Immune 
System (AIS). 
After evaluating AIS for network intrusion detection, Kim [76] in 2001 
noted that the size of data which defines self and non-self is enormous; the 
system could not manage to generate a single valid detector after one day; over 
600,000 detectors would be required; and, it would take over 1,000 years to 
generate that many detectors.  He concluded that AIS had a severe scaling 
problem. 
Matzinger in 1994 [77] had proposed a new viewpoint of the human 
immune system called Danger Theory, which emphasized the recognition of 
danger instead of self/non-self.  Examples of danger in this context are tissue 
destruction, temperature, and an abnormally released molecule from a cell. 
Danger Theory was applied to AIS by Aickelin [78] in 2002 with a 
suggestion to use it for computer security.  He noted that negative selection is 
imperfect resulting in false positives being inevitable; that the self/non-self 
boundary is blurred; and, that self changes over time.  With the qualification that 
negative selection is important, he noted the following seven considerations for 
AIS Danger Theory: 
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1. An Antigen Presenting Cell (APC) is required which can present a 
danger signal. 
2. Danger in AIS Danger Theory just means something interesting, 
such as in data mining, and does not necessarily refer to actual 
danger. 
3. A Danger Signal can be positive or negative (no danger). 
4. A spatial Danger Zone needs a measure of proximity, such as 
distance or time. 
5. A Danger Signal itself should not lead to further Danger Signals. 
6. Priming killer cells via APCs in spatially distributed models might be 
relevant. 
7. Examples of other considerations are how many antibodies should 
receive signals from a given APC; and, Danger Theory relies on 
concentrations, not binary matching. 
He also noted that Danger Theory had quite a number of elements and 
might need to be altered for AIS. 
In relation to computer security Anomaly Detection, Aickelin [78] noted 
that when a detector (T cell) is activated, it is reported to a human operator who 
decides if there is a true anomaly.  If so, then the detector becomes a memory 
(persistent) detector.  He noted that scaling is a problem in AIS:  …it becomes 
more and more problematic to find a set of detectors that provides adequate 
coverage whilst being computationally efficient. He adds that Danger Theory 
assists in the scaling issue:  It restricts the domain of non-self to a manageable 
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size, removes the need to screen against all self, and deals adaptively with 
scenarios where self (or non-self) changes over time.  He suggested these as 
possible Danger Signals in computer security: 
 Too low or too high memory usage 
 Inappropriate disk activity 
 Unexpected frequency of file changes as measured for example by 
checksums or file size 
 SIGABRT signal from abnormally terminated UNIX processes. 
 Presence of non-self. 
Powers and He in 2008 [79] proposed a hybrid AIS/SOM system, but their 
AIS component was without Danger Theory.  The AIS results were fed into a 
SOM for classification. 
Fu in 2008 [80] used a clustering algorithm of the data to represent tissue 
in an AIS system so that changes in this tissue could produce danger signals.  
Each cluster represented a cell, which had mass, age, and a location.   
A method inspired by dendritic cells was proposed by [81] in 2008 
suggesting excessive CPU load, frequency of file changes, bandwidth saturation, 
and abnormal rates of e-mail communications as sources of danger signals. 
Dasgupta and Niño wrote a comprehensive review of AIS, including 
Danger Theory, in 2009 with a section on computer security [82]. Wu and 
Banzhaf reviewed AIS, including Danger Theory, and other computationally 
intelligent methods in 2010 [83] noting that most of the algorithms were tested on 
benchmark datasets, but that real-world environments are far more complicated; 
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that the scaling problem needs to be overcome; and, that current AIS algorithms 
oversimplify their counterparts in immunology. 
Kulis, et al, in 2011 [84] proposed a fuzzy dendritic cell algorithm with 
access to memory as an adaptation to AIS Danger Theory to reduce the amount 
of antigens sampled in order to improve runtime costs. 
 
27 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY AND COMPONENTS 
A comprehensive methodology was developed which overhauled 
concepts of intrusion detection including a new model of intrusion detection types 
created in order to facilitate analytical research in this area; a computational 
model created in order to lay a foundation for data analysis; and, a hybrid system 
composed of an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB), a Self-Organizing Map 
(SOM), a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS), Svensson and Josang (SJ) Fusion, and 
Artificial Immune System Danger Theory (AISDT).  A subsection for each of 
these concepts follows. 
LLNIDS TYPES OF INTRUSION DETECTION 
Historical descriptions of types of intrusion detection have been 
inconsistent and have not favored an analytical discussion of network intrusion 
detection.  Not all of the historical labels of types are necessary, they are not 
mutually exclusive, and as individual groups they have not been demonstrated as 
being complete.  Rather than arbitrate which of these previous labels should be 
used and how they should be defined, new labels have been created to describe 
types of local network intrusion detection in a manner which favors an analytical 
environment. 
These new types are explained below, but first some terminology needs to 
be stated in order to later describe the types.  An Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) is software or an appliance that detects intrusions.  A Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS) is an appliance that detects an intrusion on a network.  
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In this research, network means a landline network.  Local network intrusion 
detection refers to the instant case of network intrusion detection. 
 
Figure 3, A Local Landline NIDS 
Figure 3 illustrates the location (in yellow) of a Local Landline Network 
Intrusion Detection System (LLNIDS) as used in this research.  It is an IDS on a 
landline between a local network and the Internet.  The point of view of this 
research is from inside the LLNIDS.  Users on the local network may have other 
ways of accessing the Internet that bypass the LLNIDS, such as wireless and 
dialup.  This research is restricted to the LLNIDS as described here. 
Examples of detection which are not Local Landline Network Intrusion 
Detection (LLNID) include detection on the host computer, detection by someone 
else out on the Internet, or detection by someone out in the world, such as a 
perpetrator bragging in a bar.  This research concerns LLNID and the new types 
described in this paper refer to LLNID.  A network intrusion in this context means 
one or more transmissions across the network that involves an intrusion.  A 
single Internet transmission is often called a packet.  Therefore, using this 
terminology, the physical manifestation of an intrusion on a network is one or 
more packets, and intrusion detection is the detection of these packets that 
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constitute intrusions.  Intrusion detection research needs a model of types of 
intrusions and types of intrusion detection that benefits analysis of methods.  This 
research focuses only on LLNID.  These are the proposed types of intrusions for 
the special case of local landline network intrusion detection that facilitate 
intrusion detection research analysis in the LLNID context: 
 Type 1Intrusion: An intrusion which can be positively detected in 
one or more packets in transit on the local network in a given time 
period. 
 Type 2 Intrusion: An intrusion for which one or more symptoms 
(only) can be detected in one or more packets in transit on the local 
network in a given time period. 
 Type 3 Intrusion: An intrusion which cannot be detected in 
packets in transit on the network in a given time period. 
These three types of intrusions are necessary for analytical research in 
order to indicate and compare kinds of intrusions.  A positive intrusion is different 
than only a symptom of an intrusion because immediate action can be taken on 
the first whereas further analysis should be taken on the second.  Both of these 
are different than intrusions which have been missed by an LLNIDS.  To show 
that these three types are mutually exclusive and are complete for a given time 
period, consider all of the intrusions for a given time period, such as a 24-hour 
day.  The intrusions which were positively identified by the LLNIDS are Type1 
intrusions.  Of the remaining intrusions, the ones for which the LLNIDS found 
symptoms are Type 2.  Here the hypothesis is that the LLNIDS can only find an 
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intrusion positively or only one or more symptoms are found.  No other results 
can be returned by the LLNIDS.  Therefore, the remaining intrusions are Type 3, 
which are intrusions not detected by the LLNIDS.  No other types of intrusions in 
this context are possible. 
 
Figure 4, Types of Intrusions for LLNIDS 
Figure 4 is a diagram that illustrates the types of intrusions as described 
above.  An intrusion is either Type 1, Type 2, Type 3, or it is not an intrusion. 
Those were the types of intrusions.  Next are the types of intrusion 
detection.  There are three types of network intrusion detection that correspond 
to the three types of intrusions in the LLNID context: 
 Type 1Network Intrusion Detection: A Type 1 Intrusion is 
detected in a given time period. 
 Type 2 Network Intrusion Detection: One or more symptoms 
(only) of a Type 2 Intrusion are detected in a given time period. 
 Type 3 Network Intrusion Detection: No intrusion is detected in a 
given time period. 
Admittedly, Type 3 is not a detection but the lack of detection.  It is 
included because these three types of detection correspond to the three types of 
intrusions and Type 3 Intrusion Detection facilitates analysis of intrusion 
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detection methods.  Examples of Type 3 Intrusion Detection are nothing was 
detected; no attempt was made at detection, an intrusion occurred but was not 
detected by the LLNIDS; and, no intrusion occurred.  All of these have the same 
result:  there was no detection of an intrusion by the LLNIDS. 
Each of the three network intrusion detection types is necessary to 
describe all of the types of intrusion detection.  A positive detection of an 
intrusion is different than just a symptom of an intrusion because a positive 
detection can be immediately acted upon while a symptom indicates that further 
analysis is needed.  Both of these are different than intrusions that are missed by 
network intrusion detection.  To show that these types are mutually exclusive and 
complete for a given time period, consider an LLNIDS looking at network packets 
for a given time period, say a 24-hour day.  For all packets that the LLNIDS 
determines positively indicates an intrusion the LLNIDS has accomplished Type 
1 intrusion detection.  Of the remaining packets, for each packet that the LLNIDS 
determines is a symptom of an intrusion the LLNIDS has accomplished Type 2 
intrusion detection.  The remaining packets represent Type 3 intrusion detection.  
These three types of network intrusion detection are complete in this context 
because they cover all possibilities of intrusion detection.  In common language, 
Type 1 is a certainty, Type 2 is a symptom, and Type 3 is an unknown. 
Those were types of intrusion detection.  Next are types of methods and 
alerts.  LLNID methods can be defined in terms of the three intrusion types: 
 Type 1NID Method/Alert: A method that detects a Type 1 Intrusion 
and an alert that indicates a Type 1Intrusion. 
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 Type 2 NID Method/Alert: A method that detects a symptom of a 
Type 2 Intrusion and an alert that indicates a symptom (only) of a 
Type 2 Intrusion. 
 Type 3 NID Method/Alert:  A method that does not exist, thus 
there is no alert. 
These types of methods and alerts are necessary to differentiate that 
some methods are positively correct, other methods only indicate symptoms of 
intrusions, and some methods do not exist.  They are mutually exclusive because 
a local method either positively indicates an intrusion (Type 1), it only detects a 
symptom of an intrusion (Type 2), or it does not exist (Type 3).  They are 
complete because there are no other types of methods in this context. 
Those were types of methods and alerts.  Next are types of false 
positives.  The term false positive generally has meant that an intrusion detection 
system has sent a false alarm.  False positives are generally undesirable 
because the false positive rate of intrusion detection systems can be high and 
can use up a lot of seemingly unnecessary, and limited, resources.  However, 
with these new types, the concept of a false positive is different for different 
intrusion detection types in the LLNIDS context.   
 Type 1False Positive: A Type 1 Method produces an alarm in the 
absence of an intrusion. 
 Type 2 False Positive: A Type 2 method produces an alarm in the 
absence of an intrusion. 
 Type 3 False Positive:  Does not exist because no alarm is 
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produced. 
A Type 1 False Positive indicates a problem with the type 1 method which 
should be corrected.  Type 2 False Positives are expected because Type 2 
Methods do not positively detect intrusions, they only detect symptoms of 
intrusions.  There is no Type 3 False Positive because no detections and alerts 
are produced for Type 3 Intrusion Detections.  These types of false positive are 
necessary because they each indicate separate network intrusion detection 
issues.  Type 1 is a network intrusion detection problem which needs to be 
corrected and Type 2 is expected.  The two types of false positive are mutually 
exclusive and complete because only Type 1 Network Intrusion Detection can 
produce a Type 1 False Positive and only Type 2 Network Intrusion Detection 
can produce a Type 2 False Positive.  No other types of false positives in this 
context are possible.  Since Type 1 and Type 2 of local network intrusion 
detection methods are mutually exclusive, these are also mutually exclusive. 
 
Figure 5, Types of Intrusion Detection for LLNID 
Figure 5 is a Venn diagram which illustrates types of intrusion detection in 
the LLNIDS context.  The horizontal line separates intrusions at the top from non-
intrusions at the bottom.  A Type 1 detection is in the upper left of the circle if it is 
actually an intrusion or it is in the lower left of the circle if it is a false positive.  A 
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Type 2 detection is in the upper right of the circle if it is actually an intrusion or it 
is in the lower right of the circle if it is a false positive.  Everything outside of the 
circle is Type 3 detection whether it is an intrusion or not. 
This typing system allows illustration that empirically most intrusion 
detection is not Type 1 (positive detections), but Type 2 (symptoms of 
detections), and Type 3 (missed detections).  This differentiation is essential in 
proceeding in a scientific way for improved intrusion detection. 
Previously labeled types of intrusion detection do not fit neatly into these 
three new types.  Misuse detection, for example, in some cases could indicate a 
definite intrusion and would then be Type 1, or it could indicate only symptoms of 
intrusions in other cases and would then be Type 2.  The comparison of false 
positives of different methods of Misuse Detection is an invalid technique unless 
Type 1 methods are compared only with Type 1 methods and Type 2 methods 
are compared only with Type 2 methods.  Anomaly detection, for example, would 
tend to be Type 2, but some anomalies could clearly indicate intrusions and 
would be Type 1.  Type 1 and Type 2 methods of Anomaly Detection should be 
separated before making any comparisons.  Likewise with intrusion detection 
labels based on activity, appearance, authentication analysis, behavior, 
knowledge, models, profiles, rules, signature, static analysis, statistics, and 
thresholds.  These are still useful as descriptive terms, but they are not as useful 
in analyzing methods of determining whether or not an intrusion has occurred 
because they allow the comparisons of apples and oranges in numerous ways.  
The labels Type 1 and Type 2 give us more analytical information:  either an 
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intrusion has occurred or else only a symptom of an intrusion has occurred.  
Type 3 intrusions tell us that we should find out why an intrusion was not 
detected in the network traffic so that we can create new rules to find more 
intrusions in the future.  Previously labeled types of intrusion detection do not 
give us as much analytical information as do types 1, 2, and 3. 
Using this system, one can clearly state objectives of LLNID research in a 
new way which was previously only implied.  The significance of given time 
period is apparent in the descriptive of these objectives because the objectives 
are stated in terms of progress from one time period to another time period.  
Here are specifics for LLNID research: 
 Type 3 NID Research:  Find ways of detecting intrusions that are 
currently not being detected, moving it up to type 2 or 1 intrusion 
detection. 
 Type 2 NID Research:  Improve Type 2 Intrusion Detection with 
the goal of moving it up to Type 1 Intrusion Detection. 
 Type 1NID Research: Improve Type 1 Intrusion Detection so that it 
is faster, uses fewer resources, and has fewer false positives. 
Each of these types of research are necessary because finding new 
methods of intrusion detection is different than improving symptom detection 
which is different than making Type 1 Intrusion Detection more efficient.  They 
are also complete because there are no other types of intrusion detection 
research in this context. 
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Table 1, Summary of LLNID Types 
  Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Intrusion 
This can be positively 
detected by LLNIDS 
A symptom of this 
can be detected by 
LLNIDS 
This is not 
detected by LLNIDS 
Intrusion 
Detection 
This positively detects 
an intrusion 
This detects one or 
more symptoms 
(only) of an intrusion 
An intrusion is not 
detected 
Method 
How to positively 
detect an intrusion 
How to positively 
detect a symptom of 
an intrusion 
An intrusion is not 
detected 
Alert 
This positively  signifies 
an intrusion 
This signifies a 
symptom of an 
intrusion 
This does not occur 
False 
Positive 
An alert positively 
signifies an intrusion, 
but there is no 
intrusion 
An alert signifies a 
symptom of an 
intrusion, but there 
is no intrusion 
An alert does not 
occur 
Research 
Improve Type 1 
Intrusion Detection, 
such as by increasing 
the speed of detection, 
using less resources, 
and having fewer false 
positives 
Improve Type 2 
Intrusion Detection 
so that it becomes 
Type 1 Intrusion 
Detection 
Detect Type 3 
intrusions so that 
they become Type 
2 or Type 1 
 
Table 1 summarizes the types discussed in this section.  These are some 
ways of how researchers can use these types:  research that compares false 
positive rates of Type 1 methods with false positive rates of Type 2 methods is 
not valid because Type 1 methods are not supposed to have false positives 
whereas Type 2 methods are expected to have false positives.   Discounting 
Type 3 intrusion detection because of the amount of time taken may be irrelevant 
if otherwise the intrusion would not be found, at all.  Proposing that intrusion 
prevention will replace intrusion detection is a false claim so long as types 2 and 
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3 intrusions continue to exist.  Rather than disregarding Type 2 methods, 
research should attempt to fuse the results of Type 2 methods in order to move 
them up to Type 1. 
THE LLNIDS COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
The proposed Local Landline Network Intrusion Detection System 
(LLNIDS) Computational Model covers intrusion detection data from packet 
analysis to sophisticated Soft Computing methods.  The LLNIDS Computational 
Model begins with a transmission of digital network traffic and proceeds stepwise 
to higher concepts.  The terminology for the input data changes depending upon 
the level of the concept.  The lowest level concept in this research is the network 
transmission, which is a series of bits called a frame or a packet.  Frame refers to 
a type of protocol, such as Media Access Control (MAC), which is used between 
two neighboring devices, where the series of bits are framed by a header at the 
start and a particular sequence of bits at the end.  Packet refers to many types of 
protocols, such as Internet Message Control Protocol (ICMP), User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP), and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).  A packet is used for 
hops between numerous devices, such as Internet traffic.  The length of the 
series of bits in a packet is often indicated at certain locations in the headers of 
the packets.  A frame passes a packet between two neighboring devices, where 
another frame passes the same packet between the next two devices, and 
subsequent frames keep passing the packet forward until the journey of the 
packet is concluded.  Since frames and packets are variable lengths, they are 
represented by a set of objects which represent the various elements of 
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information inside the frame or packet. 
A Transmission ( ) consists of a set of objects ( ) representing elements 
of information in that transmission. 
                    (1) 
where     .  Examples of objects in a transmission are the source MAC 
address, IP address, and port; the destination MAC address, IP address, and 
port, the direction of the traffic, protocols used, flags set, sequence numbers, 
checksums, type of service, time to live, fragmentation information, and the 
content being sent. 
 
Figure 6, A Sample Packet 
Figure 6 is a sample packet as displayed by tcpdump [85].  Header 
information extracted from the packet is displayed across the top.  The leftmost 
column is the byte count in hexadecimal.  The packet itself is displayed in 
hexadecimal in columns in the middle.  Character representations of the 
hexadecimal code, when possible, are shown on the right.  The packet is a 
transmission set,  , with variable length objects as elements.  Example object 
elements for this set are the protocol, UDP, and the destination port, 16402, both 
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of which have been extracted from the packet code. 
If an intrusion occurs on a local landline, it occurs in one or more  , so 
LLNID means inspecting  ‗s for intrusions.  Not all of the available data in   has 
equal relevance to intrusion detection and the reduction of the amount of data is 
desirable in order to reduce the resources needed for analysis.  This process has 
been called feature deduction [86], feature reduction [86], feature ranking [87], or 
feature selection [86].  The first feature selection must be done manually by a 
knowledge engineer, after that the features can be ranked and/or reduced 
computationally.  Soft Computing methods often use data structures of n-tuple 
formats, such as one-dimensional arrays, sets, vectors, and/or points in space.  
Since sets can be used as a basis to describe these data structures, the next 
step in the computational model is to convert features of T into higher levels of 
sets which can be further manipulated for data analysis.  The next set to be 
considered is an Event ( ) which consists of a set of elements ( ) obtained from 
the objects of  , and which changes the concept level from a transmission of 
objects to a set of elements: 
                    (2) 
where      and the following condition is also met: 
                   (3) 
How to construct    from the objects of   is feature selection--elements 
should be selected which can detect intrusions.  The Imprecision Principle 
applies to feature selection and experimentation is appropriate.  An example of 
possible elements for an event is the source IP address, the destination IP 
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address, the source and destination ports, the protocol, and the size of a packet 
crossing the network. 
Table 2, A Sample Event 
UDP 231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402 
 
Table 2 shows a sample event with the following elements:  The protocol 
is UDP, the source IP address is 231.240.64.213, the destination IP address is 
238.87.208.113, and the destination port is 16402.  These elements were object 
elements in the sample transmission set shown above.  The process of pulling 
data objects from a packet and saving them as Event elements is called parsing 
the data. 
The next step is to add Meta-data ( ), if appropriate, about the event 
consisting of meta-data elements ( ): 
                   (4) 
where     .  Meta-data is data about data.  In this context, it means data 
about the transmission that is not inside the transmission, itself.  Examples of 
meta-data are the time when a packet crossed the network, the device which 
detected the packet, the alert level from the device, the direction the packet was 
travelling, and the reason the packet was detected.  The concept level has 
changed from a set of elements to a set of meta-data about the set of elements. 
Table 3, Sample Meta-Data 
20100916 00:14:54 FW 
 
Table 3 shows sample meta-data for an event.  The meta-data in this table 
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is the date, 20100916, and the time, 00:14:54, at which an appliance detected 
the transmission, and a label for the appliance that detected the packet, FW. 
A Record ( ) of the event includes both the event, itself, plus the meta-
data: 
       (5) 
An example of a record is an entry in a normalized firewall log.  The 
concept level has changed from a set of meta-data to a set that includes both the 
elements and meta-data about those elements.  In practice, the meta-data 
typically occurs in   before the elements to which the meta-data refers. 
Table 4, A Sample Record 
20100916 00:14:54 FW UDP 231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402 
 
Table 4 is a sample record, which consists of meta-data and elements 
from the previous examples for  and  .  Before proceeding to the next step, the 
attributes of R for a given analysis should be in a fixed order because they can 
later become coordinates in a location vector.  Processing the data into fixed 
orders of attributes is called normalizing the data. 
A Log ( ) of records is a partially ordered set: 
           (6) 
An example of a log is a file containing normalized firewall log entries.  An 
infinite-like log could be live streaming data. 
Table 5, A Sample Log 
20100916 00:14:54 FW UDP 231.240.64.213 238.87.208.113 16402 
20100916 00:14:56 FW TCP 216.162.156.85 198.18.147.222 40833 
20100916 11:14:57 FW ICMP 90.29.214.20 198.18.147.221 41170 
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Table 5 shows a sample log.  It is like the sample record, above, except 
there are three entries instead of just one entry.  The concept level has changed 
from a set of meta-data and elements to a collection of sets of meta-data and 
elements.  L can be considered to be a set of vectors; L can also be considered 
to be a matrix.  If L is a text file, each line of the file is one location vector and the 
entire file is a matrix, changing the concept level to a matrix. 
If the features have been selected successfully, an intrusion, or one or 
more symptoms of it, should be able to be detectable in  .  Therefore, LLNIDS 
intrusions and intrusion detection can be defined in terms of   and  .  Let R be 
the universal set of   and let    represent a set of R that describe a Type 1 
Intrusion.  Then    is the set: 
                                            (7)  
Formula 7 formulates a Type 1 Intrusion.  Examples of Type 1 intrusions 
are a Ping of Death and a get request to a known malicious web site.  These 
intrusions can potentially be prevented.     has the same attributes as L in that it 
can be considered to be a set of location vectors or it can be considered to be a 
matrix.  As matrices, the number of columns in    and L for an analysis must be 
the same, but the number of rows in    and L can be different.  For reference 
below, let    be the universal set of all Type 1 intrusions.  The concept level for    
has changed from a matrix to a set of matrices.  That was about intrusions.  Now 
here is the function for Type 1 Intrusion Detection,   
 : 
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     {
                  
               
  (8)  
Formula 8 is the function for Type 1 Intrusion Detection, which returns 
True if an intrusion has been detected, otherwise it returns False.  Next is Type 2 
intrusions and intrusion detection.  In most cases, one or more events occur 
which makes the security technician suspicious that an intrusion has occurred, 
but more investigation is necessary in order to reach a conclusion.  This 
scenario, which is Type 2 Intrusion Detection, is similar to a patient going to a 
physician, who looks for symptoms and then makes a decision about whether or 
not the patient has a medical problem.  The security technician also looks for 
symptoms and then makes a decision about whether or not an intrusion has 
occurred.  Let R be the universal set of   and let    represent a set of   that 
describes one or more symptoms of a Type 2 Intrusion.  Then    is the set: 
                                             (9)  
Formula 9 formulates a Type 2 Intrusion.  Let    be the universal set of all 
Type 2 intrusions.  Now here is a formula for Type 2 Intrusion Detection,   
 : 
 
  
     {
                  
               
 
(10)  
The   
     function returns True if a symptom of an intrusion has been 
detected; otherwise it returns False.  Possible examples of Type 2 intrusions are 
the following:  The set of records consisting of a single local source IP address 
and numerous unique destination addresses all with a destination port of 445; the 
set of records consisting of a local IP address sending numerous e-mails during 
non-working hours; and, the set of records consisting of high volumes of UDP 
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traffic on high destination ports to a single local IP address matching criteria set 
by a Self-Organizing Map.  Like a cough does not necessarily indicate a cold, the 
detection of an intrusion symptom does not always indicate an intrusion. 
That was Type 2 intrusions and intrusion detection.  Next is Type 3 
intrusions, which are not detected in a given time period.  Let R be the universal 
set of   and let    represent a set of   that describes a Type 3 Intrusion.  Then    
is the set: 
                                             (11)  
   is the universal set of all   .  A Type 3 Intrusion is not detected: 
   
            (12)  
As a summary, compare these three types of intrusion detection in a 
medical context to typhoid fever, which is spread by infected feces.  Type 1 
intrusion detection (prevention) is to wash one‘s hands after using the toilet; Type 
2 intrusion detection is to recognize the symptoms, such as fever, stomach ache, 
and diarrhea; Type 3 detection is represented by Typhoid Mary, who had no 
readily recognizable symptoms. 
The next step involves changing the data formats from R and L into forms 
which can be directly manipulated by analysis software.  (Packet analysis can 
already occur directly on T.)  This involves converting records into vectors and 
logs into matrices.  This conversion is straightforward with a Detailed Input Data 
Vector,   , which starts as a set and is then used later as a location vector: 
      (13)  
More feature reduction can occur at this step.  If the order of each element 
45 
 
 
in the set is fixed, i.e., if the order of the attributes of the set are fixed, then the 
set can become a location vector.  An example of    as a set is {1280093999, 
10.3.4.10, 10.3.4.12, 445, TCP} which could indicate a time stamp in seconds, a 
source IP address, a destination IP address, a destination port, and a protocol.  
Converting IP addresses to numerical formats, and assigning a numerical label to 
TCP, the same example of    as a location vector could be (1280093999, 
167969802, 167969804, 445, 6). 
Aggregate elements are also possible for a given time period, such as 
aggregate data for each local IP address for a day.  Examples of such aggregate 
elements are the total number of R for the local IP address, the count of unique 
source IP addresses communicating with the local IP address, and the 
percentage of TCP network traffic for the local IP address.  Many other types of 
aggregate elements are possible.  The Imprecision Principle applies and 
experimentation is appropriate.  These aggregate elements can be converted to 
an Aggregate Input Data Vector,   , with     being an aggregation function: 
                                 (14)  
where     .  Again, the order of the attributes of the set are fixed so that the 
set can become a location vector.  An example of    as a set is {20100725, 428, 
10.3.4.10, 48, 0.89} which could indicate that on 7/25/2010 428 unique source IP 
addresses attempted to contact destination IP address 10.3.4.10 on 48 unique 
destination ports with the TCP protocol being used 89 percent of the time.  The 
date and IP address become a label for the location vector when the location 
vector is created.  From the same example above, the location vector for IP 
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address 10.3.4.10 on 7/25/2010 is (428, 48, 0.89). 
Both of these types of sets/vectors can be generalized as a General Input 
Data Vector, V : 
              (15)  
The next concept level is to generalize V so that it can be used as input to 
a wide variety of Soft Computer and other methods.  The generalized elements 
of V are be represented by e.  V is an n-tuple of real numbers which can be 
perceived, depending upon how it is intended as being used, as being a set, a 
location vector, or a matrix: 
Set:   {              } (16)  
Vector:                    (17)  
Matrix:   [          ] (18)  
where     .  For example, if the elements of V are an n-tuple of the real 
numbers 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1, then V can be perceived as being a set, 
a vector or a matrix: 
Set:                             (19)  
Vector:                             (20)  
Matrix:   [                  ] (21)  
An Input Data Matrix, D, is a collection of similar types of V:  Here D is 
represented as a set of V : 
                    (22)  
where     .  D is on the same concept level as L—each can be considered to 
be sets of location vectors or a matrix.  Here is how D can be represented as a 
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matrix: 
 
  [
         
   
           
] 
(23)  
where      and     . 
For example, given these three location vectors, each represented as a 
matrix, 
    [                  ] (24)  
    [                  ] (25)  
    [                  ] (26)  
D would be represented this way as a matrix: 
 
  [
                  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
] 
(27)  
   can refer to an Input Data Matrix consisting of    and    can refer to 
an Input Data Matrix consisting of   .  D can also be one of these three types: 
1.        refers to a data set which is used to train the software 
intelligence. 
2.       refers to a data set which is used to test the software 
intelligence. 
3.       refers to feral data. 
D can be used in virtually an infinite variety of analysis methods, from 
spreadsheet methods to statistics and data mining, to machine learning methods.  
For example,        can be used by clustering software which, after testing, would 
then classify       for intrusion detection. 
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The LLNIDS Computation Method more accurately defines information 
security concepts and scientifically ties components of information security 
together with structured and uniform data structures.  The LLNIDS can be 
extended to describe existing and potential methodologies of analysis methods 
including statistics, data mining, AIS, NeuroFuzzy, Swarm Intelligence, and SOM, 
as well as Bayes Theory, Decision Trees, Dempster-Shafer Theory, Evolutionary 
Computing, Hidden Markov Models, and many other types of analysis. 
DESIGNING THE HYBRID 
Soft Computing components can be combined in virtually an infinite 
number of ways to create hybrid methods.  The historical work of researchers 
has shown that different methods are better for different types of intrusions—
there is no one winner take all method.  The Imprecision Principle applies so that 
experimentation and intuition is appropriate.  A general ensemble design which 
applies numerous methods at once appears to be the best solution.  The LLNIDS 
Types of Intrusion help to focus the design on specific objectives, and the 
LLNIDS Computational Model provides a methodology of processing the data. 
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Figure 7, Hybrid Design 
Figure 7 illustrates a framework of some of the uncountable possibilities of 
hybridization.  Starting from the left, input data can come from one or numerous 
sources, including firewall logs, system logs, network flow data, packet analysis 
systems, and tcpdump.  For each data source the data can be preprocessed 
(normalized) many different ways for the initial analysis.  For each type of 
normalization, many alternative methods are possible for each additional step in 
the process from feature reduction to clustering, to training, and to classification.  
Several different methods are also possible for fusing the data.  The overall 
number of possibilities is too great to try them all at once. 
THE INVISIBLE MOBILE NETWORK BRIDGE (IMNB) 
The Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) was selected for data 
collection because it provided more information than firewall logs but was not as 
overwhelming as network flow data.  ANNaBell used firewall logs as input with 20 
million entries per day being typical.  Network flow data would contain more 
information, but would be based on approximately 2 billion entries per day, an 
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amount more difficult to process.  Host data cannot be trusted because 
experience has shown that current malware can exist outside of the operating 
system and can control intrusion detection software on the host.  This research 
proposes a new source of network data produced from a device that is close to, 
but not located on the host, and that produces complete, but not an 
overwhelming amount, of information:  an Invisible Mobile Network Bridge 
(IMNB). 
The illustrations below show a laptop computer configured as an IMNB.  
Invisible means that the laptop has no IP address and is invisible on Layer 3 of 
the network.  Mobile means that any computer or subnet traffic can be redirected 
through the laptop in real time without rebooting or reconfiguring any computers, 
routers, or switches.  The laptop bridge can also remain running while Ethernet 
cables are physically switched and network traffic is redirected through it.  The 
laptop bridge can then use various kinds of packet analysis software, such as PF 
[88], tcpdump [85], Snort [89], and Wireshark [90] to analyze the network traffic 
being redirected through it.  This data can also be normalized as input vectors for 
more sophisticated analysis methods such as ANNaBell. 
 
Figure 8, IMNB Desktop Insertion 
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Figure 8 shows the basic bridge setup with a laptop configured as the 
invisible mobile bridge.  A blue cable is plugged into an extra NIC in the side of 
the bridge.  The computer to be analyzed is the desktop which is connected to 
the Internet and running a YouTube [91] video.  The Internet cable is unplugged 
from the desktop and plugged into the back of the mobile network bridge.  The 
unplugged end of the blue cable is then plugged into the back of the desktop.  
The network connection is maintained and all of the desktop‘s network traffic is 
now travelling through the laptop configured as the invisible mobile network 
bridge.  The YouTube video keeps running as though nothing has changed.  The 
laptop can now capture network data and, after the intelligent software has been 
trained, act as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) doing all types of analysis on 
the data, from packet sniffing to statistics, data mining, computational 
intelligence, and Soft Computing.  Think of it as being like a heart monitor which 
is taking an EKG to show the health of the network connection. 
 
Figure 9, IMNB Subnet Insertion 
Figure 9 shows how the mobile bridge can analyze an entire subnet by 
rearranging switch cables.  The pink cable (circled in left photo) originally goes 
from the switch out to the Internet.  By plugging this pink cable into the back of 
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the laptop, and by plugging the blue cable from the laptop into the switch, 
network traffic for the entire subnet is redirected through the laptop acting as a 
network bridge.  A YouTube video runs uninterrupted during the process, and 
users of the subnet need not even be aware that a change has been made.  The 
laptop bridge can programmatically watch only certain computers on the network, 
if desired, or can also act as an IDS.  Think of it as being like a heart monitor 
taking the EKG of all of the computers on the subnet at the same time.  The 
bridge can be placed in network areas with the greatest potential impact. 
 
Figure 10, Basic IMNB Scenario 
Many scenarios for using the mobile bridge are possible, and Figure 10 
shows the main idea.  A mobile bridge is placed as a man in the middle between 
a computer and the Internet, where it collects network data on the computer.  
This data can be observed on the mobile bridge in real time as it is being saved.  
See Figure 8 for a photograph of this scenario.  The Mobile Bridge is mobile 
because this can be done many times with different computers with various 
scenarios (see more scenarios below), all without turning the mobile bridge or 
any of the computers off.  The collected data is later transferred, by any of 
various ways,  to a support computer, which then uses the data to train and test 
one or more modules containing various methods of computational intelligence 
and/or Soft Computing.  The trained and tested modules are then transferred 
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back to mobile bridges, which then become intrusion detection systems using the 
trained and tested modules. 
 
Figure 11, IMNB Symbolic Division of Labor 
A summary of this division of labor is shown in Figure 11 as three simple 
steps:  (1) one or more mobile bridges capture the data; (2) one or more support 
computers use the data to train and test intelligent software modules; and, (3) the 
modules are then used on mobile bridges for intrusion detection.  The reason 
that separate support computers are needed is because the training can be 
lengthy and computationally intensive.  Once the intelligent software modules are 
trained, though, they can be quickly and easily used by mobile bridges for real-
time intrusion detection. 
 
Figure 12, IMNB Forensics Scenario 
Live on-the-spot forensics can be quickly accomplished simply by 
switching cables.  The mobile bridge can also be inserted between a known 
infected computer and a simulated network as in Figure 12 for two major 
accomplishments:  (1) the mobile bridge can capture network information from 
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known infected computers without endangering other computers on the Internet; 
and, (2) the mobile bridge can examine the network traffic of infected computers 
for forensics value.  The first accomplishment is particularly noteworthy because 
the packet analysis can be used to create rules for Type 1 and/or Type 2 
intrusion detection, and also because the network traffic of known infections can 
be used to train and test the intelligent software modules. 
 
Figure 13, IMNB Subnet Scenario 
The mobile bridge can also be placed behind a network switch (or hub) in 
order to collect data on, and monitor, an entire subnet as illustrated in Figure 13.  
The mobile bridge can be inserted live while the network is active simply by re-
plugging cables.  The mobile bridge could alternatively take a sample of each 
computer in turn to take a closer look at each one. 
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Figure 14, IMNB WAN Scenario 
The mobile bridge can also be placed in a Wide Area Network (WAN) as 
shown in Figure 14.  The only limitation is the hardware capability of the mobile 
bridge in terms of bandwidth, storage, and processing capability.  The mobile 
bridge could alternatively cycle through each subnet or each computer for more 
detailed analysis. 
 
Figure 15, IMNB Jack Scenario 
The mobile bridge can capture and monitor the traffic visible on a jack (an 
Ethernet wall plugin) as shown in Figure 15.  Among other things, this scenario 
can tell if a switch port for a jack is properly limiting the traffic to that jack. 
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Figure 16, IMNB Task Distribution 
The tasks are distributed as in Figure 16.  Capturing must be done by a 
mobile bridge at the location of a computer or subnet.  Converting and 
normalizing the data can be accomplished by either a mobile bridge or a support 
computer.  The processing power of a support computer must be used to train 
the intelligent software modules.  Classification of new data, i.e., intrusion 
detection, must be done by a mobile bridge on site.  Further various types of 
analysis, such as fusion of intrusion alerts, can be done by either a mobile bridge 
or a support computer. 
THE SOM COMPONENT 
Since past history can be an indication of future performance, this 
research used a SOM based on ANNaBell as one of the components to be 
hybridized.  The Imprecision Principle applies and intuition and experimentation 
are appropriate.  Neural computing such as SOM is appropriate for data, such as 
network traffic, which is noisy and ill-defined [54]. 
SOM uses Hebbian [54] competitive learning which uses neighborhoods 
of nodes.  The SOM input training data is not labeled, so the learning is 
unsupervised---the SOM clusters the data with no indication of what the data 
represents. 
57 
 
 
The SOM nodes have location vectors which must have the same number 
of dimensions as the input data.  As previously discussed, the input data can be 
perceived on many levels, from a network transmission, to a set of elements, to a 
set of meta-data about the set of elements, to both the set of elements and meta-
data about those elements, to a collection of sets of meta-data and elements, to 
vectors, to sets of vectors, to a matrix.  Referring to the LLNIDS Computation 
Model discussed above, the input data is    and for SOM D is perceived as being 
a matrix.  Each row of D is a V  and every V  will have the same size   , which is 
also the number of columns in D.  Note that each V  is commonly called a vector 
even though each V  is also conceptually a row in the matrix D. 
Each node in the SOM has the same structure as V in the input data--
specifically, each node has    elements each of which is in the set of real 
numbers--and all of the nodes together in the SOM form a matrix which has the 
same number of columns as D.  Since one of the objectives of SOM is to reduce 
the representation of the data space in the input data, the number of rows in the 
SOM matrix should be less than the number of rows in D.  Let    represent a 
location vector for a node in the SOM so that    is analogous to V and let    
represent the data matrix of all of the node location vectors in the SOM so that 
   is analogous to D.  To easily differentiate between input data and node data, 
input data is designated    and node data is designated   .  Likewise, an input 
vector is    and a node vector is   .  The comparison of    and    is as follows: 
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(28)  
 
   [
           
   
            
] 
(29)  
where     ,     ,     , and      .  Each node location vector in the 
SOM (  ) may be initially created randomly or pseudo-randomly from   or from 
the domain of V  from       .  Initiating the SOM means to assign these initial 
values to the nodes. 
BMN and Distances 
The SOM methodology has three phases:  training, testing, and 
production.  The training phase uses nodes to cluster the training data; the 
testing phase tests the clusters with test data; and, the production phase 
classifies feral data using the clusters.  The concept of a Best Matching Node 
(BMN) is central to SOM, both for clustering and classification.  The Best 
Matching Node is sometimes called the Best Matching Unit or the image.  BMN is 
also sometimes called winner take all, except this is not technically correct 
because neighbors of the winner also share in the take.  This is explained further 
below. 
For BMN, the concept level changes to a multidimensional solution space 
and each of the location vectors indicate a point in this solution space.  The 
training phase of the SOM clusters node vector points in multidimensional space 
with each node typically representing a cluster.  The nodes are typically also 
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clustered, resulting in clusters of clusters.  The classification phase finds the 
BMN for a new input vector, thus indicating the cluster in multidimensional space 
which is closest to the new input location vector. 
A distance measure is needed to determine the clusters and BMN in 
multidimensional space.  Examples of possible distance measures are Euclidean 
distance and Manhattan distance.  This research uses Euclidean distance, 
represented in this formula by d : 
       √   [ ]    [ ] 
     [ ]    [ ]        [ ]    [ ]   (30)  
where x is the number of dimensions.  The next formula uses the function      as 
a distance measure to determine the BMN,     , for   : 
Another kind of distance is also used in SOM which designates a 
neighborhood of nodes.  Both types of distance are necessary in training the 
SOM.  The SOM neighborhood is a topological configuration that is determined 
by the knowledge engineer before the SOM is trained.  The Imprecision Principle 
applies to the determination of the configuration, which relies on the judgment of 
the knowledge engineer.  The rational for the specific configuration for this 
research is explained further below. 
 
Figure 17, Neighborhood of Nodes 
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Figure 17 illustrates the SOM neighborhood for a sample configuration as 
a graph in three different ways.  The concept level has changed from points in 
multidimensional space to a topological graph.  The vertices of the graph 
represent the nodes of the SOM and the edges of the graph represent neighbors 
of the nodes.  The first illustration, on the left, shows the topological configuration 
of 9 nodes in a rectangular format.  Node 1, for example, has the neighbors 2 
and 4.  Node 5 has the neighbors 2, 4, 6, and 8.  A neighborhood distance in a 
SOM is the number of edges between two nodes in the topological configuration.  
It is the number of hops, or hop count, using the edges between nodes.  The 
neighborhood distance in the topological graph is different than the vector point 
distances in multidimensional space.  Both of these two different types of 
distances are needed for the training of a SOM. 
 
Figure 18, Neighborhood Distances 
Figure 18 shows the neighborhood distances between all of the nodes 
depicted in Figure 17.  This can easily be verified by counting the edges between 
the nodes in the left graph of Figure 17.  The middle graph of Figure 17 uses the 
same topological configuration as the left graph, but physically places the nodes 
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in two-dimensional space as though the node location vectors were created at 
random.  It is possible in the middle graph of Figure 17, and in an actual SOM, 
for the vector points of two neighboring nodes to be far apart in the solution 
space.  Nodes 2 and 5 in the middle graph of Figure 17, for example, are 
neighbors, yet their vector points are the furthest apart in space.  Node location 
vectors change during training, and the right graph in Figure 17 shows an 
example representation of how a SOM neighborhood might appear after training:  
while not evenly spaced, the vector points of neighbor nodes tend to be relatively 
near each other.  Note that the neighborhood distances in all three graphs in 
Figure 17 are the same, even though the vector points of the nodes have moved 
in space.  Many other kinds of neighborhood configurations are possible besides 
the one shown in Figure 17.  The neighborhood of the BMN means all of the 
nodes, including the BMN, within a given neighborhood distance of the BMN.  
The neighborhood size refers to the given neighborhood distance.  For example, 
a neighborhood size of 2 means all of the nodes 2 edges or fewer away from the 
BMN, including the BMN, itself.  A neighborhood size of 0 would consist only of 
the BMN.  A neighborhood size begins large and shrinks during the training of 
the SOM. 
The SOM is trained by repeatedly adjusting the locations of the node 
vectors as the neighborhood size gradually becomes smaller.  Each    in        
is considered in turn and all of the nodes in the current neighborhood of the BMN 
for the instant    are moved in vector space towards that   .  The distance each 
node is moved,  , for each iteration of training is determined by the distance 
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measure,      ,  and a training factor,  , which is explained below.  The formula 
for how far to move a node for each input vector for each iteration of training is as 
follows: 
 
     {
        
                              
                                   
 
(31)  
BMI and the Training Factor 
Training factors can be determined many ways [54].  In this research, the 
training factor is determined at times by the number of Best Matching Inputs 
(BMI) in the current neighborhoods.  BMI are the counterpoint to a BMN.  If the 
BMN for a    is   , then that    is one of the BMI for that   .  Note that BMN is 
referred to  in this paper as being singular because there is only one BMN at a 
time, while BMI are referred to as being plural because there can be more than 
one best matching input at a time, even though the actual count of BMI might be 
0 or 1.  BMI have a many-to-one correspondence with a BMN. 
 
Figure 19, Best Matching Inputs 
Figure 19 illustrates the many-to-one correspondence in an example with 
six input vectors (BMI) and three node vectors (BMN).  An input vector always 
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has 1 BMN, but a node can have 0, 1, or more BMI.  Here are the Best Matching 
Nodes for each input vector and the Best Matching Inputs for each node based 
on the Figure 19 example: 
 
Table 6, BMN and BMI 
Input Vector BMN 
   1 2 
 
Node BMI 
2 2 
 
1 3 
3 1 
 
2 1,2,4,5, and 6 
4 2 
 
3 (None) 
5 2 
   6 2 
    
Table 6 shows the Best Matching Nodes and Best Matching Inputs from 
the example in Figure 19.  Referring to the table, the Best Matching Node for 
input vector 1 is 2, while the Best Matching Inputs for Node 2 are 1, 2, 4, 5, and 
6.  The number of BMI for a node is important in the calculation of  .  Let       
represent the count of BMI for Node i.  Then in the example in Table 6, |   |  
 , |   |   , and |   |   . 
The number of BMI for a neighborhood is also important.  The previous 
illustration was for the number of BMI for a node, the next illustration is for the 
number of BMI for a neighborhood.  First, the neighborhood for the example 
needs to be configured. 
 
Figure 20, Neighborhood Example 
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Figure 20 shows a possible neighborhood configuration in order to 
continue the example from Figure 19.  In this configuration, nodes 1 and 2 have a 
neighborhood distance of 1; nodes 2 and 3 have a neighborhood distance of 1; 
and, nodes 1 and 3 have a neighborhood distance of 2.  Let           represent 
the neighborhood of Node i with a neighborhood size of s for training iteration 
(time) t.  (Since multiple training iterations can be used for each neighborhood 
size, and the count of BMI can change between iterations, the iteration also 
needs to be indicated.)  Then             represents the count of all of the BMI in 
that neighborhood for that iteration.  For example, continuing the example from 
figures 19 and 20, for the current iteration             because the 
neighborhood for Node 3 with a neighborhood size of 1 includes nodes 2 and 3 
and the total number of BMI for nodes 2 and 3 is 5. 
Table 7, Counts of Neighborhood BMI 
 
Table 7 continues the example from figures 19 and 20 by showing all of 
the counts for all of the possible neighborhood sizes for each of the nodes.  This 
table shows, for example, that the count for Node 3 with a neighborhood size of 0 
is 0, with a neighborhood size of 1 is 5, and with a neighborhood size of 2 is 6. 
The next important measure used in the calculation of   is the maximum 
count of BMI in the neighborhoods for a given neighborhood size.    Let 
              represent this measurement for the neighborhood size s and 
Node 1 1 6 6
Node 2 5 6 6
Node 3 0 5 6
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training iteration t.  Referring to Table 7, the maximum count for a neighborhood 
distance of 0 is 5, the maximum count for a neighborhood distance of 1 is 6, and 
the maximum count for a neighborhood distance of 2 is 6.   
                        
               (32)  
The training factor   is calculated from               and is as follows: 
 
     
 
  
          
 
 
(33)  
A characteristic of determining the training factor this way is that BMN and 
BMI assignments must be determined during or prior to the first training iteration.  
One way of doing this is to have the initial neighborhood size include all of the 
nodes in the SOM.  Keeping track of each BMN and the count of the BMI is also 
a way of tracking the progress of the training of the SOM:  a slowing rate of 
change in these measurements is an indication of progress in the training of the 
SOM.  Again, this is how the training factor is used in the SOM: 
 
     {
        
                              
                                   
 
(34)  
And this is how the change in the node vector is used in the training for 
one input vector for one iteration of training: 
                      (35)  
An epoch is one iteration of training for the SOM.  An epoch consists of 
looking at each of input vectors   , finding the BMN      for that vector, and 
adjusting the neighborhood node vectors         appropriately as described in 
the formulas above.  If there are 65,536 input vectors, for example, as was the 
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case in ANNaBell, then one epoch consists of finding the BMN and adjusting the 
BMN neighborhood vectors for each of the 65,536 input vectors. 
The knowledge engineer must determine how many epochs should be 
used to train the SOM, which is an Imprecision Principle issue.  This can be 
decided in advance or it can be determined dynamically by monitoring changes 
in the movement of the nodes during the training.  Deciding this in advance for 
large datasets is risky for a couple of reasons:  1)  the training can last for days 
and one may not know when the training will end; and, 2) the nodes can move 
back and forth during training without converging on a solution. 
Neighborhood Sizes 
Another issue is determining what the neighborhood sizes will be for each 
epoch.  The knowledge engineer determines the original (largest) neighborhood 
size for the first epoch, then the neighborhood sizes can get progressively 
smaller down to a neighborhood size of 0 for the last epoch.  This can be done at 
a fixed rate for a fixed number of epochs, or it can be done dynamically.  The 
dynamic method monitors node movement for successive epochs until the nodes 
acceptably converge.  Then, the neighborhood size is reduced, and the further 
epochs are run until the nodes acceptably converge, again.  This is repeated until 
the nodes acceptably converge at a neighborhood size of 0.  What constitutes 
acceptable convergence is subject to the Imprecision Principle.  Indications of 
convergence are the average amount of movement of the nodes for an epoch, 
the largest single movement of a node during an epoch, and the amount of 
change in BMI between two successive epochs.  An issue to look for in 
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convergence is nodes that repeatedly move back and forth without converging. 
1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell started with a neighborhood size 
consisting of all of the nodes in the SOM.  They could run a given number of 
epochs at the same neighborhood size, saving the state of each epoch, and stop, 
allowing the knowledge engineer to compare the states of successive epochs for 
convergence.  More epochs could be run at the same neighborhood size or at a 
reduced neighborhood size, depending upon the appearance of convergence.  
This continues until the knowledge engineer is satisfied of convergence at a 
neighborhood size of 0.  Here is the pseudo-code: 
set epochs_to_run 
set neighborhood_size 
load previous state 
for each epoch 
  calculate the training factor 
  for each input vector 
    find the BMN 
    move the BMN 
    move the BMN neighbors 
  save the state 
Interpreting the Results 
After training, the output of the SOM is in   , which contains the vector 
locations of all of the SOM nodes.  The interpretation of this output data is the 
next major issue and this interpretation is subject to the Imprecision Principle.  
Many ways exist of interpreting the SOM and in a large sense understanding the 
SOM output is a data mining problem.  One way is to graphically plot the 
distances between neighboring nodes resulting in a display which shows clusters 
of nodes.  Another way is to call each dimension of the vectors a feature, and to 
data mine relationships between features in the nodes of the SOM.  The concept 
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level has changed to features representing different dimensions of the vectors.  
Yet another way is to label the types of input BMI per node and look for patterns 
of these BMI.  Each node can be labeled this way depending upon the types of 
BMI that it has.  In this research, for example, each input vector represents a 
single local IP address.  These input vectors can therefore be labeled with a type 
of network user or usage, such as student, faculty, and staff users or desktop, 
wireless, or server usage.  Subnets representing departments can also be 
labeled, as can individual computers.  The result can be a fingerprint of the kinds 
of activity for that department. 
 
Figure 21, Fingerprint of a Department 
Figure 21 plots yellow asterisks for IP addresses for a department on the 
BMN vectors on the SOM topological map resulting in a fingerprint of the network 
activity for that department.  This profiling can be a model of risk or used as 
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symptoms or danger signals.  The labeled features on this map include the 
percentage of UDP traffic, the total number of entries in a log file, the highest port 
accessed, the lowest port accessed, the number of unique ports accessed, and 
the number of unique source IP addresses in the traffic.  The origin is the location 
of the BMN for IP addresses with no log entries.  The background color is a blend 
of red, green, and blue colors for the intensities of some of the features. 
From a node point of view, the BMI of a node might primarily represent 
student computer activity, so that node could be labeled student.  From a usage 
point of view, the BMN vector can be located for the vector of each IP address in 
a department. 
 
Figure 22, ANNaBell Island 
Figure 22 is an example of a higher level feature map, created with Art of 
Illusion [92], from 3D ANNaBell.  Landscape features such as valley, plateau, 
and mountain, developed from the SOM nodes, represent types of network 
traffic.  The concept level has changed from features of vector dimensions to 
landscape features representing groups of vector dimensions.  The valley 
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landscape feature, for example, consists of nodes with vector dimensions of very 
low total number of log entries, low ratios of unique source IP addresses, very 
high ratios of port ratios, medium low ports, high high ports and low UDP ratios.  
Each small area of the feature map represents a node of the SOM based on the 
topological map, and any IP address can be plotted on this map by locating its 
BMN.  The neighbors on the feature map are based on the topological map, 
while the colors and elevations are based on intensities of vector elements.  An 
IP address with a BMN in the valley area, for example, indicates normal office 
network traffic for that IP address.  An IP address with a BMN in a mountainous 
area, depending upon the specific location, might warn of dangerous network 
traffic. 
The testing of the SOM is a classification problem.  New location vectors 
from       are used to find the corresponding BMN for each and plot the location 
on the feature map.  Then, the kind of network traffic of the test vector is 
compared with the kind of network traffic for the BMI of the BMN to see if they 
are similar, or not.  A test vector from a sample of malware, for example, should 
have a BMN in a mountainous area, while a test vector from an office computer 
should have a BMN in the valley.  The results of the test should give some 
indication of the reliability of the SOM.  Since testing only compares each input 
vector with each node once, it can be done extremely fast. 
The SOM in production is also a classification problem.  Vectors from feral 
network traffic are matched with the corresponding BMN for each.  If the BMN for 
an input vector is in a dangerous area of the feature map, then an alarm, or 
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danger signal, is produced.  Since a SOM in production only compares each 
input vector with each node once, it can be done extremely fast. 
The 1D ANNaBell had a single node, 996, which indicated malicious or 
vulnerable traffic, and which made alarms and follow up response 
straightforward.  That node is outdated, though, now, and so is no longer useful 
for two reasons:  the network traffic of Storm Worm changed, and other 
computers with this characteristic were handled by incident responders until 
there were none left.  3D ANNaBell had ambiguous areas of the feature map 
which indicated danger areas, and so the alerts were not as straightforward.  
This ambiguity led to a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS). 
THE FIS COMPONENT 
A Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is a classifier that helps to cope with 
inexact descriptions of data.  This research adapts FIS to send danger signals 
based on SOM results.  A visual examination of ANNaBell Island shows 7 
general areas on the map, but many of the boundaries of these areas are 
indistinct. 
 
Figure 23, Fuzzy Divisions of SOM Topological Map 
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Figure 23 is a drawing of the 7 general landscape areas of ANNaBell 
Island.  These 7 areas represent different mixes of network activity involving 
number of log entries, number of source IP addresses, ratio of UDP traffic and 
other indicators.  The IP addresses with malicious traffic, for example, have 
tended to have a BMN in the Bot Hills area.  The UDP Plains tend to represent 
student computers—the IP address of any office computer with a BMN in the 
UDP Plains area is suspect.  Locating the BMN of an IP address on the map is 
helpful in profiling computers, but the areas of the map are indistinct, so FIS 
becomes beneficial in analyzing SOM output.  3D ANNaBell was converted into 
FIS by observing the colorized nodes in the map to determine general areas, and 
then by examining and comparing the intensities of the node vector values for 
each dimension.  The concept level has changed from landscape features to 
fuzzy inference.  The fuzzy values for the Traditional Valley, for example are total 
entries, very low; ratio of unique source addresses, high; ratio of unique 
destination ports, medium; lowest port, mixed; highest port, low; and, UDP ratio, 
medium. 
Table 8, 3D ANNaBell Fuzzy Values 
 
Table 8 shows all of the fuzzy values for all seven landscape feature areas 
of ANNaBell Island.  These were determined by looking at the feature maps, 
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getting the location vectors for the nodes in each area, and assigning fuzzy 
values to the intensities of the values for each dimension for the nodes in each 
area.  If network traffic for an IP address had a high amount of entries, a low ratio 
of source IP addresses, a low ratio of unique ports, a medium lowest port, a high 
highest port, and a high UDP ratio, then that traffic would have a fuzzy match 
with the traffic for BMI in the Bot Hills area of the feature map.  In other words, 
the network traffic had similarities to malware traffic. 
 
Figure 24, Matlab Illustration 
Figure 24 is a Matlab illustration of the fuzzy values of the ratio of unique 
ports and the UDP ratio compared to the Bot Hills area of the feature map. 
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Figure 25, Intensities of Features 
Figure 25 shows the intensities for each of the dimension values for the 
3D ANNaBell location vectors which were used to create Table 8.  The 
landscape feature overlays are derived from Figure 21 and are similar to the 
drawing in Figure 23.  Looking at the Traditional Valley area of each part of 
Figure 25, for example, one can see that the total normalized is very low; the 
source ratio is high; the port ratio is medium; the lowest port is mixed; the highest 
port is low, and the UDP ratio is medium.  Judgments of boundaries and 
intensities may vary somewhat because of the Imprecision Principle.  The 
splotchiness of the intensities for d) Lowest Port indicate that this feature was not 
very useful in determining relevant types of network traffic. 
Fuzzy rules can be created from this information.  Here is an example for 
determining if a type of network traffic is similar to the type of traffic represented 
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by the Bot Hills, in which case an alert should be produced: 
IF Total Normalized is High 
AND Source Ratio is Low 
AND Port Ratio is Low 
AND Lowest Port is Medium 
AND Highest Port is High 
AND UDP Ratio is High 
THEN Alert is High 
 
Crisp output can be derived from the fuzzy inferences using Table 8.  
Suppose, for example, that network traffic for a certain local IP address for a 24-
hour period had 1,574, 557 firewall log entries.  Using the procedures for 3D 
ANNaBell, this would be normalized to 0.779349187.  Suppose these entries 
came from 1,512,381 unique source addresses, which would be a 0.96051214 
source ratio.  Also, these entries targeted 956,961 unique ports, for a port ratio of 
0.607765017.  The lowest port attempted was 24,439 (0.372914079 normalized) 
and the highest port attempted was 43,940 (0.670486862 normalized).  The UDP 
ratio was 0.546359486.  The linguistic variables from Table 8 are Low (L), Very 
Low (VL), Medium (M), Somewhat High (SH), High (H), Very High (VH), and 
Extremely High (XH).  Below are graphs illustrating how to get crisp output for the 
data from this example.  Sugeno-style inference is used in this example for 
computational efficiency [93]. 
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Figure 26, Total Normalized Graph 
Figure 26 shows the conversion to linguistic variables for the total 
normalized dimension.  The input is shown rounded to 0.779, which converts to a 
fuzzy membership of 1.0 for Somewhat High; a fuzzy membership of 1.0 for 
High; and, a fuzzy membership of 0.2 for Very High.  The zero memberships are 
not shown in the figure:  Low, 0; Very Low, 0; Medium, 0; and, Extra High, 0.  
These output values will be used further below. 
 
Figure 27, Source Ratio Graph 
Figure 27 shows the conversion for the source ratio dimension.  The input 
is shown rounded to 0.96.  The non-zero outputs are Extra High, 0.95; and, High, 
0.03. 
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Figure 28, Port Ratio Graph 
Figure 28 shows the conversion for the port ratio dimension with the input 
shown rounded to 0.61.  The single non-zero output is Medium, 1.0. 
 
Figure 29, Lowest Port Graph 
Figure 29 shows the conversion for the lowest port dimension with the 
input shown rounded to 0.37.  The non-zero outputs are Medium, 0.99; and, Low, 
0.01. 
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Figure 30, Highest Port Graph 
Figure 30 shows the conversion for the highest port dimension with the 
input shown rounded to 0.67.  The non-zero outputs are Medium, 0.9; Somewhat 
High, 0.62; High, 0.225; and, Very High, 0.02. 
 
Figure 31, UDP Ratio Graph 
Figure 31 shows the conversion for the UDP ratio dimension with the input 
shown rounded to 0.546.  The only non-zero output is Medium, 1.0. 
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Table 9, Crisp Outputs 
  
Total 
Normalized 
Source 
Ratio 
Port 
Ratio 
Lowest 
Port 
Highest 
Port 
UDP 
Ratio 
Crisp 
Output 
UDP Plains 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 
Bot Hills 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.990 0.225 0.000 0.369 
Plateau 0.000 0.030 1.000 0.000 0.225 0.000 0.209 
Hi Port Mountains 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.990 0.020 0.000 0.168 
Origin Basin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Traditional Valley 0.000 0.030 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.338 
Port Cliffs 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.990 0.225 0.000 0.203 
 
Table 9 orders the outputs from the six previous graphs and displays the 
calculated crisp outputs for each of the landscape features.  Notice the similarity 
of Table 9 with Table 8:  they are the same except fuzzy memberships are 
substituted for linguistic variables.  Table 9 adds an additional column on the 
right which shows the calculated crisp outputs.  These crisp outputs are 
determined with Sugeno-style inference where all of the weights are 1.0 for the 
simplicity of illustration, which results in each crisp output simply being the 
average of the values for each row.  Since the linguistic variables overlap for the 
various landscape features, the total of the crisp outputs do not necessarily add 
up to 1. 
The danger signals come from the crisp outputs, each of which can range 
from 0 to 1.   Since the Bot Hills is a known bad area, the crisp output for that 
area, 0.69, is a danger signal.  Safe signals are also possible.  Since the Origin 
Basin and the Traditional Valley are known safe areas, their crisp outputs of 
0.000 and 0.338 are safe signals.  The danger signals of the other landscape 
areas depend upon the type of computer being evaluated.  The crisp output of 
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0.167 for the UDP plains, for example, would be a danger signal for an office 
computer, but would not be relevant for a student computer.  Ways of fusing 
these danger signals to obtain a consensus are the subjects of the next two 
topics: SJ Fusion and AISDT. 
THE SJ FUSION COMPONENT 
The most robust method for fusing intrusion alarms found in the literature 
was a form of subjective logic explained by Svensson and Josang [49].  A portion 
of that work concerns obtaining a consensus of possibly conflicting and uncertain 
opinions.  In order to maintain linguistic consistency, this consensus is called 
fusion and this particular type of fusion is called SJ Fusion, for the authors of this 
paper.  All of the formulas in this section are from that source.  Characteristics of 
SJ Fusion are that it is based on belief theory operating on uncertain beliefs 
about crisp propositions.  It is appropriate for intrusion detection because an 
intrusion either has taken place or it has not (it is crisp), and beliefs about an 
intrusion can have varying degrees of certainty.  In the current context, danger 
signals have varying degrees of certainty.  The concept level is changing from 
crisp output from FIS, to uncertain danger signals of an intrusion.  SJ Fusion will 
be described, then the example from Table 9 will continue. 
Let       ̅  be a state space containing x and its complement  ̅.  In the 
current context, x represents an intrusion and  ̅ represents the lack of an 
intrusion.  These variable names are pertinent in SJ Fusion: 
 b Belief.     Is the belief in x, from 0 to 1. 
 d Disbelief.     Is the disbelief in x, from 0 to 1. 
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 u Uncertainty.     Is the uncertainty in the belief of x, from 0 to 
1. 
 a Atomicity.     Is the atomicity setting for x.  Atomicity is a 
variable to allow the knowledge engineer to manipulate uncertainty 
in the output, from 0 to 1.  The neutral setting is 0.5. 
This restriction applies: 
            (36)  
The combination of these variables is called the opinion of x and is the 
tuple: 
                  (37)  
The probability expectation for the truth of x is: 
               (38)  
One can see in the above formula how the atomicity a splits the probability 
for uncertainty u.  An atomicity value of 0.5 evenly splits the uncertainty 
probability.  The knowledge engineer sets the atomicity value and a value of 0.5 
is used in this research. 
Some of the crisp outputs for the landscape features in Table 9 support 
the truth of an intrusion (danger) and some support the untruth of an intrusion 
(safety).  In all cases, The Bot Hills support the truth of an intrusion and the 
Traditional Valley and Origin Basin support the untruth of an intrusion.  The other 
landscape features depend upon the type of computer, such as a student 
computer, or an office computer, which is being evaluated.  For an office 
computer, the UDP Plains, Plateau, Hi Port Mountains, and Port Cliffs also 
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support the truth of an intrusion.  This information sets up the following SJ Fusion 
opinions with numbers taken from the crisp output of Table 9: 
Table 10, SJ Fusion Opinions 
  b d u a 
UDP Plains 0.167 0.000 0.833 0.500 
Bot Hills 0.369 0.000 0.631 0.500 
Plateau 0.209 0.000 0.791 0.500 
Hi Port Mountains 0.168 0.000 0.832 0.500 
Origin Basin 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
Traditional Valley 0.000 0.338 0.662 0.500 
Port Cliffs 0.203 0.000 0.797 0.500 
 
These varying opinions in Table 10 can not only be fused into a single 
opinion, but can be done so with discounting.  Suppose that for office computers 
the UDP Plains, the Plateau, the Hi Port Mountains and the Port Cliffs are 
indicators of danger, but not to the same extent as the Bot Hills are an indicator 
of danger.  These opinions can be discounted by opinions of opinions.  Let A and 
B be two agents where  
     
    
    
    
   is A‘s opinion of B as an advice 
provider and  
     
    
    
    
    is B‘s opinion of x.  Then,  
   
   
     
     
     
      is the discounted opinion such that: 
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The symbol  represents this operation so that   
     
    
 .  This 
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operation  is associative but not commutative so that in a chain of opinions, 
the discounting can start at either end, but the order of opinions is significant.  To 
continue the example from Table 9, if the knowledge engineer‘s opinion of the 
danger signals of the UDP Plains, the Plateau, the Hi Port Mountains and the 
Port Cliffs is (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0.5), then the discounted danger signals of these 
landscape features are: 
Table 11, Discounted Opinions 
  b d u a 
UDP Plains 0.084 0.000 0.917 0.500 
Plateau 0.105 0.000 0.896 0.500 
Hi Port Mountains 0.084 0.000 0.916 0.500 
Port Cliffs 0.102 0.000 0.899 0.500 
 
A fused consensus can be made of the opinions using discounted 
opinions when appropriate.  Let  
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Then,  
  
 is the consensus between  
 and  
  representing an 
imaginary agent [A,B] ‘s opinion as if that agent represented both A and B.  By 
using the symbol  to designate this operator,  
     
    
 .  This 
consensus operator is both commutative and associative.  The fusion/consensus 
is done by starting with two of the landscape feature opinions to create an interim 
consensus.  A third landscape feature opinion is then fused with the interim 
consensus to create a new interim consensus.  This is repeated with each 
additional appropriate landscape feature until a final consensus is reached. 
Table 12, Office Computer Consensus 
  b d u a k 
UDP Plains dis. 0.084 0.000 0.917 0.500   
Bot Hills 0.369 0.000 0.631 0.500 0.969 
Interim A 0.404 0.000 0.597 0.500   
Plateau dis. 0.105 0.000 0.896 0.500 0.958 
Interim B 0.443 0.000 0.558 0.500   
Hi Port Mtn. dis. 0.084 0.000 0.916 0.500 0.963 
Interim C 0.470 0.000 0.531 0.500   
Origin Basin 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 1.000 
Interim D 0.470 0.000 0.531 0.500   
Traditional Valley 0.000 0.338 0.662 0.500 0.841 
Interim E 0.370 0.213 0.418 0.500   
Port Cliffs dis. 0.102 0.000 0.899 0.500 0.941 
Consensus 0.399 0.204 0.399 0.500   
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Table 12 shows the line-by-line calculated consensus for an office 
computer for the example from Table 9, using discounted opinions where 
appropriate.  The significance of the office computer IP address designation is 
that the opinions/danger signals from the UDP Plains discounted, Plateau 
discounted, Hi Port Mountains discounted, and Port Cliffs discounted are 
included in the consensus, which would not be the case for a student computer 
IP address.  The calculations were performed two lines at a time from top to 
bottom.  For example, the consensus for UDP Plains discounted and Bot Hills is 
Interim A; the consensus for Interim A and Plateau discounted is Interim B; and 
so forth, until the overall consensus is shown on the bottom line.  One can follow 
the changes as the interim danger signals, highlighted in bold red, are calculated 
from the top down:  0.404, 0.443, 0.470, 0.470, and 0.370.  The result for the 
final consensus/danger signal is on the bottom line:  0.399—this is the fused 
danger signal which is the output that is passed on to the Artificial Immune 
System (AIS), covered in the next section.  The calculation for a student 
computer does not include the opinions of all of the landscape features because 
students are allowed peer-to-peer activity, online gaming, and other activities 
which are not appropriate for most office computers. 
Table 13, Student Computer Consensus 
  b d u a k 
Traditional Valley 0.000 0.338 0.662 0.500   
Bot Hills 0.369 0.000 0.631 0.500 0.875 
Consensus 0.279 0.244 0.477 0.500   
 
Table 13 shows the consensus for the same example as though it were for 
86 
 
 
the IP address of a student computer.  The Origin Basin opinion/danger signal 
was omitted because it had no effect in this example, having values of zero for 
both belief and disbelief.  Compare the final consensus/danger signal for the 
office computer, 0.399 with the final consensus/danger signal for the student 
computer, 0.279.  They are different even though the same values were used 
because student computers are expected to have more variety of network activity 
than office computers. 
The terminology changes somewhat going into the next section.  Danger 
Signal is used exclusively instead of consensus.  The Danger Signal is the result 
of the consensus for the beliefs of an intrusion, derived from the opinions taken 
from the values for the landscape features.  For clarification, the SJ fused Danger 
Signal for the example of the office computer is 0.399 and the SJ fused Danger 
Signal for the example of the student computer is 0.279.  Whether these 
numbers represent low or high levels of danger is not readily apparent.  One way 
of resolving this would be to derive many danger signals and compare them. Any 
possible significance of the disbelief in danger in these examples is not apparent.  
Also, suppose that Snort fired a low alert on the same IP address involved with 
these danger signals.  How would this Snort alarm be figured in?  The Dendritic 
Cell Algorithm (DCA) explained further below addresses these issues. 
THE AIS DANGER THEORY COMPONENT 
Danger signals from the SOM and FIS components integrate naturally into 
Artificial Immune System Danger Theory (AISDT).  AIS is based on the 
exceedingly complex human immune system, which is summarized here only to 
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the extent to provide some context for AISDT.  Immunology is a developing and 
controversial field of study in which experts sometimes define the same terms 
somewhat differently.  This paper seeks only to summarize and paraphrase key 
biological concepts as they are related to AIS Danger Theory, so see 
immunology texts for differing immunology viewpoints and more technical 
information than what is presented in this paper. 
Human Immunity 
The human immune system has two descriptive systems, innate and 
adaptive, that sometimes act together [94].  The innate immune system is non-
specific, fast, has no memory, and usually is of short duration.  The adaptive 
immune system is specific, slower in development, has memory, and is long 
lasting.  Both systems have mechanisms for distinguishing self from non-self. 
[94] 
Objects associated with the innate immune system, but which may also 
interact with the adaptive system, include skin, cytokines, natural killer cells, 
macrophages, and dendritic cells [94].  Dendritic cells have been known since 
1973 but their importance in both innate and adaptive immunity has only recently 
been more clearly defined.  Dendritic cells develop in the bone marrow and then 
circulate in the blood and some tissues where they play a role in surveillance.  
(They are named for their branched projections which are similar to dendrites of 
neurons, but a dendritic cell only has this appearance and is not a neuron.)  
When dendritic cells are activated they become mature and are the only cells 
capable of activating T-cells.  Dendritic cells are activated upon exposure to 
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danger signals, such as cytokines, and Pathogen-Associated Molecular Patterns 
(PAMPs).  When activated, dendritic cells migrate to lymph nodes where they 
present the associated antigen to T-cells and help to define the T-cell response. 
[94] 
The adaptive immune system has two general systems:  humoral 
immunity and cell-mediated immunity [94].  Humoral immunity is found in extra-
cellular body fluid or serum, and is mediated by antibodies produced by B-cells.  
The complement of an antibody is an antigen, which is a substance or molecule 
that is a possible invader and that triggers the production of antibodies.  This is 
sometimes referred to as a self/non-self system with antibodies being a part of 
the self which looks for antigens which are conceptually the non-self. [95]  
Antibodies find antigens by binding with them.  Binding (also called matching or 
fitting) occurs at a binding site, which is complementary in size, shape, charge, 
and hydrophobic or hydrophilic character [96].  The part of the antigen which 
matches an antibody is called the epitope.  Self/non-self immunity protection has 
a direct comparison with anomaly detection in information security:  determine 
what is normal (self), and then look for what is not normal (non-self). [94] 
Cell-mediated immunity involves T-cells, which originate in bone marrow 
and develop in the thymus, after which they enter the blood stream. [94]  T-cells 
are adept at identifying and killing cells that have been infected by pathogens.  
Helper T-cells regulate the humoral immune system and cytotoxic (killer) T-cells 
destroy infected cells. 
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Table 14, Comparison of Immune Systems 
 
Table 14 shows some general comparisons between the types of immune 
systems.  Not all experts agree on these divisions, so see immunology texts for 
more detailed information.  The innate and adaptive immune systems interact 
with each other.  A phagocyte is an eating cell that consumes pathogens or 
particles as part of immune activity.  A macrophage is a type of phagocyte that 
digests the invader as part of the innate immune system.  However, it sometimes 
presents part of the invader, the antigen, at its cell boundary.  The part of the 
macrophage which presents the antigen is called the Major Histocompatibility 
Complex (MHC).  A cell that presents an antigen, such as a macrophage, is 
called an Antigen Presenting Cell (APC).  A dendritic cell is also a kind of APC. 
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Negative Selection in Immunity 
The immune system uses a process which computer scientists have 
labeled a Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA)—rather than looking for intruders, 
the immune system looks for non-self.  Parts of the following description are from 
[97].  B-cells produce many potential antibodies with each B-cell producing only a 
single type of potential antibody.  The potential antibodies are compared with self 
and the ones that are similar to self are eliminated, so only antibodies that do not 
match with self remain.  The result is that whatever the remaining antibodies 
match with is non-self.  These remaining antibodies are then dispatched to look 
for matching antigens.  When an antigen is found, the B-cells which make the 
corresponding antibody then make mass quantities of this particular antibody in 
order to find more of the same antigen.  Helper T-cells regulate this B-cell 
activity.  A B-cell whose antibody has matched an antigen is called mature or a 
plasma cell.  Mutations of the antibody occur to improve the matching with the 
found antigen.  Memory cells remember this antibody in order to continue looking 
for this antigen in the future.  Since there is an almost infinite variety of possible 
foreign molecules, an enormous amount of antibodies are needed.  This is done 
biologically by using chains of molecules in the antibody which can be shuffled 
for different combinations of matches.  An estimated 24 million combinations are 
possible which are increased even further by other means.  An immediate 
problem is apparent in imitating this biological activity on a computer:  the 
biological activity is massively parallel with all of the numerous B-cells and 
antigens being processed at the same time, whereas on a computer, a Central 
Processing Unit (CPU) can only process the activity of one B-cell or antigen at a 
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time.  If an antibody matches an antigen and is activated, then it is duplicated by 
clonal selection in order to broaden the search and find more of the same 
antigen.  Any B-cells which make this antibody are signaled to start mutating in 
order to attempt to find a better match for this particular antigen.  These activated 
B-cells also start tagging the antigens so that macrophages and neutrophils can 
identify them and destroy them.  These activated B-cells also reproduce as a 
memory cell in case the same antigen appears in the future.  Some future 
antibodies are positively selected (instead of NSA) to match remembered 
antigens. 
The cell-mediated immune system T-cells also detect antigens using T-
Cell Receptors on their cell walls using a negative selection method similar to 
antibodies [97].  However, antibodies can match whole foreign antigens, but T-
cell receptors can only match digested fragments of antigens presented by a 
Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC).  Two kinds of T-Cells react two 
different ways when matching an antigen presented by an MHC:  a helper T-Cell 
then proceeds to activate B-cells which make the corresponding antibody while a 
killer T-cell simply kills the host cell presenting the antigen.  A killer T-cell is 
sometimes called a cytotoxic T-cell.  Activated T-cells reproduce to save a 
memory of the antigen.  Some future T-cells are positively selected (instead of 
NSA) to match remembered antigens. [97] 
A Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) is simple without the scientific 
microbiology terminology: 
1. Generate random detectors 
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2. If a detector matches self, then eliminate it. 
3. If a detector matches anything else, trigger a response. 
4. Periodically recycle detectors, keeping the ones that have triggered 
a response. 
Danger Theory in Immunity 
Besides computation time, this algorithm has obvious problems in biology:  
bacteria in the intestines is foreign, for example, but is not dangerous; cancerous 
cells are self, but are dangerous.  Likewise in network intrusion detection, an 
anomaly often turns out to be legitimate user behavior, and malicious behavior 
can be disguised as normal network traffic.  Matzinger [77] addressed this 
problem in biology in 1994 noting that the immune system is far more concerned 
with danger and potential destruction than with the distinction between self and 
non-self.  She questioned why some foreign objects elicit immune responses 
while silicone, well-boiled bone fragments, solitary haptens (parts of antigens), 
and food do not.  As a result she proposed Danger Theory.  The concept level 
with NSA is that the antigen is the indication of the intrusion:  if one finds an 
antigen then one has found an intrusion.  Examples of antigens in intrusion 
detection on this concept level are malicious types of network traffic or 
fingerprints of malware found in network packets.  This concept level changes 
with Danger Theory in which the antigen is just a label that identifies something.  
Examples of an antigen in AIS Danger Theory for intrusion detection are an IP 
address or a network connection.  The indicators of intrusions in Danger Theory 
are a Pathogenic Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP), danger signals, and 
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safe signals.  An example of a PAMP in AIS Danger Theory for intrusion 
detection is a network packet that matches a Snort rule.  An example of a danger 
signal in biology is a chemical signal that a cell is dying as a result of an attack by 
a pathogen.  An example of a safe signal in biology is a chemical signal that a 
cell is dying normally, called apoptosis.  An example of a safe signal in intrusion 
detection is network traffic that is believed to be acceptable. 
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
Dendritic cells are the arbiters of Danger Theory, deciding whether or not 
to initiate a response to an intrusion.  When a dendritic cell consumes a 
pathogen or particle, it travels to a lymph node where it becomes an Antigen 
Presenting Cell (APC) for T-cells and B-cells, presenting the antigen as being 
either safe or dangerous.  The process of deciding whether an antigen is safe or 
dangerous is imitated with the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) [50] which is a 
method of fusing a series of four types of input into a single contextual output.  
The concept level has changed to a dendritic cell algorithm being a fusion 
method for intrusion detection.  The four types of input are PAMP signals, danger 
signals, safe signals, and inflammation, which is just an indicator that may 
increase the other values.  An example of a PAMP signal in AIS Danger Theory 
for intrusion detection would be the severity of a Snort alert with 0.33 
representing low severity, 0.67 representing medium severity, and 1.0 
representing high severity.  PAMP and danger signals along with danger 
contexts could be considered to be symptoms of infection depending upon the 
circumstances.  The algorithm maintains three interim values each of which are 
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aggregated:  a co-stimulation signal (CSM), a semi-mature signal, and a mature 
signal.  The co-stimulation signal represents the accumulation of evidence:  when 
a given threshold of evidence is reached, called the migration threshold, then a 
decision is made.  In biology, the dendritic cell then migrates to a lymph node 
and presents the antigen as being either safe or dangerous.  The semi-mature 
signal represents evidence of safety, and the mature signal represents evidence 
of danger.  Here is the general formula for the interim part of this fusion from [50], 
labeled in this paper as the Interim DCA Formula: 
 
       (  ∑  
 
   ∑  
 
   ∑  
 
)        
(39)  
The input to the Interim DCA Formula, above, is a series of values for 
PAMP (  ), Danger (  ), and Safe (  ), signals and an Inflammation (I ) signal. 
Groups of these streaming values are summated with each type of input modified 
by the corresponding weight,   ,   , or   .  The knowledge engineer decides 
how large the groups of data are with the Imprecision Principal.  This formula is 
repeated three times per calculation with varying weights for each group of data 
providing three separate outputs:  one for the CMS signal, one for the semi-
mature signal, and one for the mature signal.  The two base weights, W1 and W2 
in the table below, are provided by the knowledge engineer with the Imprecision 
Principal and the remaining weights are either static or else derived from the two 
base weights. 
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Table 15, Weights for Interim DCA Formula 
 
Table 15 shows how the weights are determined for the Interim DCA 
Formula.  When the Interim DCA Formula is used to calculate the CSM Signal, 
for example,      ,    
  
 
, and          . 
Table 16, Weight Examples 
 
Table 16 shows what the weights would be, using Table 15, for each of 
the three outputs of the Interim DCA Formula if the knowledge engineer set 
     and    .  When calculating the output for the mature signal, for 
example,       .  These sample weights and the Interim DCA Formula can be 
used to continue the example from the end of the previous section. 
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Table 17, Interim DCA Formula Output Example 
 
Table 17 considers a Snort alarm along with values from Table 12 to 
calculate interim DCA signals and provide an example contextual output.  The 
PAMP Signal column includes a value of 0.330 representing a low Snort alert.  
The sum of PAMP alerts is this one signal of 0.330.  This PAMP signal 
summation of 0.330 is taken times weights of 6, 0, and 1 for values of 1.980, 0, 
and 0.330 for the CSM, semi-mature, and mature signals respectively.  The 
values labeled Belief in Table 12 are labeled Danger Signal in Table 17 and their 
summation is shown as 0.744, which is converted by weights to 2.232, 0, and 
0.372 for the CSM, semi-mature, and mature signals respectively.  The values 
labeled Disbelief in Table 12 are labeled Safe Signal in Table 17 and their 
summation is shown as 0.338, which is converted by weights to 3.042, 0.338, 
and -0.507 for the CSM, semi-mature, and mature signals respectively.  The 
interim outputs are aggregated across the rows with the sum for the CSM Signal 
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being 7.254, the sum for the semi-mature Signal being 0.338, and the sum for 
the mature Signal being 0.195.  The concept level has changed to Snort and 
SOM outputs becoming biological inputs to artificial dendritic cells. 
To obtain a contextual output for the example in Table 17, first consider 
the interim CSM Signal of 7.254.  If that is enough stimulation, then the DCA is 
ready to determine the contextual output.  If that is not enough stimulation, then 
the DCA needs more input.  The knowledge engineer determines using the 
Imprecision Principal what constitutes enough stimulation to determine if enough 
information has been considered to produce an output.  In a system with multiple 
artificial dendritic cells, the thresholds can be set randomly within a range.  
Suppose for this example that 7.254 is enough stimulation.  Then, the semi-
mature signal is compared to the mature signal.  If the semi-mature signal is 
greater than the mature signal, then the contextual output is safe; otherwise the 
contextual output is danger.  If the context is danger, then the dendritic cell 
presents the antigen as being danger and immune response (incident response) 
is initiated; otherwise, it is not initiated.  In this example, since the semi-mature 
signal of 0.338 is greater than the mature signal of 0.195, the contextual output is 
safe, the artificial dendritic cell presents the antigen as being safe, and immune 
response (incident response) is not initiated.  The DCA is intended for multiple 
artificial dendritic cells, each of which can consider different inputs in different 
time frames.  With multiple dendritic cells the immune response depends upon 
the greater of semi-mature or mature contexts. 
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METHODOLOGY SUMMARY 
This chapter explained methodologies for components of the system with 
examples from early research using firewall logs.  The next chapter shows how 
these methodologies were implemented with data collected from the Invisible 
Mobil Network Bridge (IMNB) using new dynamic methods. 
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CHAPTER 4 – IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
This chapter demonstrates the implementation and results of the 
methodology developed in the previous chapter using data collected by the 
Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) instead of from firewall logs.  This 
chapter also explains how the training factor was automatically created initially 
for each neighborhood size and changed dynamically during the training, as well 
as how the neighborhood sizes were changed dynamically during the training.  A 
new training monitoring method is demonstrated.  The newly trained SOM is 
analyzed with new color maps and a new 3D map being created, showing danger 
and safe zones.  A method is shown of automatically applying FIS.  New data is 
used to test the Danger Theory aspects of the new hybrid, and the potential of an 
evolving universal SOM is explained. 
The IMNB made network traffic captures in 53 separate sessions including 
traffic involving desktops, laptops, lab computers, subnets, and computers known 
to be infected with malware.  The network traffic included live connections to the 
Internet and simulated network traffic using INetSim [98].  Samples included 
boots, active directory and local logins, shutdowns, browsing, heavy usage, 
videos, pornography, banking, inactivity, both static and dynamic IP addresses, a 
variety of operating systems, and long and short duration captures.  Malware 
traffic was related to a computer with multiple infections, a prober, a computer 
with TDSS/TDL4, and a computer with the Blackhole Exploit Pack.  In order to 
distinguish this new ANNaBell from 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell, this new 
version is called LLNIDS ANNaBell. 
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Original captures for LLNIDS ANNaBell were saved to binary pcap files 
(creating sets of transmission, T ) which were translated with tcpdump to text files 
(creating sets of events, E, with tcpdump adding metadata, M., producing 
records, R, and logs, L).  A script obfuscated the local IP addresses to remove 
identifying information.  These text files were processed by another script to 
create aggregate vectors (  ) in 10-second increments.  These increments were 
further aggregated into 60-second sliding windows, creating a potential data input 
matrix (D).  Most of these vectors from D were saved in a file for training (      ) 
and the remaining were saved in a file for testing (     ). 
Features for LLNIDS ANNaBell were selected primarily based on the 
previous successes of 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell.  The words subject and 
alien are used in describing IP addresses in the features, indicating which side of 
the Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) an IP address is active on.  The alien 
side of the IMNB is the side connected with the Internet or the simulated network, 
such as INetSim.  The Subject side is the other side of the IMNB which is 
connected to the one or more computers or subnet which is being analyzed.   In 
network traffic coming from the subject computer and/or the subject subnet, the 
source IP addresses are the subject IP addresses.  All other IP addresses are 
alien.  While 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell were based on a Vulture Fest 
model of attempted, but denied, alien network traffic, LLNIDS ANNaBell is based 
on two-way actual (not denied) network traffic.  For this reason, one-way alien 
traffic is ignored in LLNIDS ANNaBell.  The features for LLNIDS ANNaBell are as 
follows: 
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 ip_count The number of subject IP addresses involved in the 
network traffic.  Naively this would be one IP address, but some 
computers used multiple IP addresses and some of the traffic 
included numerous local IP addresses on a subnet.  For traffic 
involving multiple subject IP addresses, such as for a subnet, 
vectors were created for each subject IP address and also for the 
subnet as a whole. 
 tot_count The total count of records, R. 
 uniq_aliens The number of unique alien IP addresses which are 
being communicated with by subject IP addresses.  This would 
typically be non-local IP addresses out on the Internet, IP 
addresses on another subnet, or IP addresses spoofed by a fake 
network such as INetSim. 
 uniq_ports The number of unique destination ports in the traffic. 
 port_ave The average of the port numbers of the destination 
ports in the traffic. 
 tcp_rat The ratio of TCP protocol in the traffic. 
 bytes The total number of bytes involved in the traffic. 
ip_count was included as a new feature because it helps to differentiate 
between subnets and individual computers and also because single computers 
might be using more than one IP address.  tot_count was used successfully in 
1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell.  uniq_aliens and uniq_ports are used similarly 
as in 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell, except here they are counts and not ratios.  
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port_ave is an indicator of how much high-numbered destination ports are used 
in the traffic.  lo_port (for lowest destination port) was used in 1D ANNaBell but 
was not indicative of malware, so this feature was eliminated.  hi_port (for highest 
destination port) was successfully used in 3D ANNaBell, but port_ave should be 
an even better indicator.  tcp_rat replaces upd_rat (for UDP ratio) in 1D 
ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell because more ICMP protocol network traffic 
appears in IMNB logs.  Since UDP and ICMP traffic can be associated more with 
malicious network traffic, tcp_rat is used as a potential indicator of safe network 
traffic.  bytes was added as a feature because the number of bytes transmitted in 
the network is readily available from IMNB logs and this should be a notable 
characteristic of types of network traffic.  (The number of bytes transmitted was 
not available for 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell.) 
A SOM size of 91 nodes was selected which provided for an average of 
approximately 31 inputs per node, slightly more detailed than previous versions 
of ANNaBell.  The vector elements were each normalized to a range of [0, 1] 
during training so that each vector dimension would have a similar magnitude of 
effect on the training.  This normalization can only be approximated because 
future high values of some of the count elements, such as the tot_count, cannot 
be anticipated.  The training factor is called eta in some papers and alpha in 
others.  Eta and alpha are interchangeable in this paper and both mean the 
training factor.  The training software was written in Perl [99]. 
TRAINING THE LLNIDS SOM 
Several enhancements were made to reduce the SOM training time 
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including how the nodes were set up, automatically determining the first training 
factor for each neighborhood distance, dynamically changing the training factor 
for each iteration, monitoring the progress of the training, and dynamically 
determining the number of iterations for each neighborhood distance. 
The initial    was created less randomly as for 1D ANNaBell and 3D 
ANNaBell in order to reduce training time.  In 1D ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell, 
the only special vectors were the origins, (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0).  The remaining vectors were created randomly.  In LLNIDS ANNaBell, all of 
the initial    vectors were    vectors.  Ten of these vectors were special and the 
others were chosen randomly from   .  These were the ten special vectors 
chosen for the initial   : 
1. The origin (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). 
2. The vector from    with the maximum ip_count value. 
3. The vector from    with the maximum tot_count value. 
4. The vector from    with the maximum uniq_aliens value. 
5. The vector from    with the maximum uniq_ports value. 
6. The vector from    with the maximum port_ave value. 
7. A vector from    with the maximum tcp_rat value. 
8. The vector from    with the maximum bytes value. 
9. The vector from    with the most average values. 
10.   The vector from    which was the most distant from the origin. 
Noting that the origin and most of the nodes (all except one) with the 
maximum values ended up on the edge of the meta-hexagon in 3D ANNaBell, 
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the origin and all of the vectors with the maximum values were assigned to edge 
nodes of the meta-hexagon in the initial    of LLNIDS ANNaBell.  The vector 
with the most average values was assigned to Node 0 in the center of the meta-
hexagon. 
 
Figure 32, Initial SOM Layout 
Figure 32 shows the initial node assignments with Node 0 in the center 
being assigned the most average vector.  The other assignments in clockwise 
order from the upper right are Node 62, most distant; Node 65, maximum 
tot_count; Node 70 maximum uniq_aliens; Node 75, origin; Node 78, maximum 
ip_count; Node 80, maximum tcp_rat; Node 82, maximum uniq_ports; Node 85, 
maximum port_ave; and, Node 90 maximum bytes.  All of the remaining node 
vectors were taken randomly from   .  Figure 32 also shows the node numbering 
from Node 0 in the center spiraling out in a clockwise direction to Node 90 at the 
top, which is a numbering scheme similar to that used in 3D ANNaBell. 
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Automating the Initial Training Factor 
  
  
          
 
 
(40)  
Formula 40 is the training factor, explained earlier, for the first iteration of 
each new neighborhood size.  It is the inverse of the maximum vector node 
neighborhood BMI count for a given neighborhood size, s, and iteration, t.  This 
training factor was manually estimated in 3D ANNaBell, which stopped training 
between each neighborhood size.  However, it was automatically calculated in 
LLNIDS ANNaBell, which continued training with the new training factor without 
stopping between neighborhood sizes. 
Dynamically Changing the Training Factor 
The training factor continued to be automatically adjusted between each 
iteration in order to reduce training time.  This was done by keeping track of the 
average movement of the nodes during training iterations.  If the average 
movement for the current iteration was less than the average movement for the 
previous iteration, then the training factor was increased by 3 percent, otherwise 
the training factor was reduced by 50 percent.  The 3 percent increase was 
determined by experimentation.  The 50 percent reduction was necessary to 
prevent thrashing back and forth between alternate sides of a target. 
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Figure 33, Training Factor Adjustments 
Figure 33 illustrates the rational of the per-iteration training factor 
adjustment.  The exact location of the target (star) is not necessarily known 
during the approach.  Moving from left to right the training factor is increased by 3 
percent per iteration as the target is approached in order to reduce the time in 
reaching the target.  When the target is overshot, the training factor is reduced by 
50 percent so that the target is continued to be approached without just thrashing 
back and forth between alternate sides of the target.  In SOM training, a target is 
the theoretical location where a node best represents a cluster of input vectors.  
The SOM training factor is adjusted based on an average of all of the node 
vector changes.  This average is determined by monitoring the SOM training. 
Monitoring the Progress 
Below is the standard output report for a single iteration of LLNIDS 
ANNaBell: 
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Iteration 0 distance 10. 
alpha 0.000353606789250354. 
This iteration lasted 0.130956367651621 minutes. 
Average change = 0.339842126153345. 
BMN changes:  2828.  Max BMI:  2828 
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The above output provides the following information.  This is the report for 
Iteration 0 with a neighborhood distance of 10.  The training factor was 
0.000353606789250354 and the processing time for this iteration was 
0.130956367651621 minutes.  There were 2,828 changes for a BMN and the 
maximum count of BMI for the largest neighborhood was 2,828.  A text-based 
meta-hexagon then provides a summary of the distribution of the BMI for each 
node.  A period (.) represents no BMI for a node; a 1 represents from 1-9 BMI for 
a node; an X represents from 10-99 BMI for a node; and, an H represents 100 or 
more BMI for a node.  The next iteration was as follows: 
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Iteration 1 distance 10. alpha 0.000364214992927864. 
This iteration lasted 0.115660949548086 minutes. 
Average change = 0.127156481290656. 
BMN changes:  1677.  Max BMI:  2828 
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The above output indicates that this information is for Iteration 1.  The 
neighborhood distance is still 10.  The training factor (alpha) has increased by 3 
percent.  The average change is less than the previous iteration.  The number of 
BMN changes has gone down to 1,677.  The knowledge engineer can monitor 
this output in real time to verify that the SOM is making progress in training; 
otherwise, variables may need to be adjusted and the training restarted.  The 
processing time should be monitored because training can last for days.  
Experience indicates that the training factor, the average change, and the 
number of BMN changes should all approach zero over numerous iterations.  
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Dynamically Changing the Neighborhood Size 
One of the goals of this research was to determine a dynamic way of 
determining when to change the neighborhood size.  Experimentation showed 
that BMN changes converged within a reasonable amount of time to zero for 
each neighborhood distance, so this became the determining factor for going to 
the next neighborhood size.  However, a maximum limit on the number of 
iterations for each neighborhood size was placed in the code to prevent any 
potential infinite loops.  Experimentation showed that after the BMN changes 
reached zero, they did not necessarily stabilize at zero---they could go back up in 
a future iteration.  Even so, the first time BMN changes reached zero became the 
deciding factor to change neighborhood sizes because this represented some 
convergence, and the nodes would move again at the next neighborhood size 
unless it was zero.  A perfect solution was not attempted because a goal of this 
SOM was to be perpetually dynamic with no final ending state.  This will be 
explained more when testing of the SOM is covered further below. 
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Iteration 56 distance 10 
alpha 2.42215458070362e-05 
This iteration lasted 0.112553381919861 minutes. 
Average change = 0.000119039384720208. 
BMN changes:  0.  Max BMI:  2828 
 
                 X 
              .     . 
           .     .     H 
        .     .     .     . 
     .     .     .     .     . 
  H     .     .     .     .     X 
     .     .     H     .     . 
  .     .     .     .     .     1 
     1     .     .     .     . 
  .     .     .     H     .     . 
     .     1     .     .     1 
  X     .     .     .     .     . 
     .     .     .     H     . 
  .     .     .     .     .     . 
     .     .     .     .     . 
  X     .     .     .     .     H 
     .     .     X     X     . 
        X     .     .     . 
           .     .     . 
              1     . 
                 H 
 
The above output shows the status after Iteration 56, which was the last 
iteration at a neighborhood distance of 10.  Note that the distribution of the BMI 
has significantly changed so that most nodes have zero BMI.  The BMI will be 
redistributed to the other nodes as the neighborhood size decreases in the 
training.  Experience has shown that, in general, BMI are distributed to the outer 
nodes at first, and then redistributed to the inner nodes. 
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Iteration 309 distance 5 
alpha 1.36307815988189e-05. 
This iteration lasted 0.0593816002209981 minutes. 
Average change = 6.91557543954126e-05. 
BMN changes:  0.  Max BMI:  2828 
 
                 H 
              X     . 
           1     .     . 
        1     1     .     . 
     X     .     .     .     . 
  H     X     1     .     .     1 
     X     1     .     .     . 
  X     X     1     .     .     H 
     1     X     .     .     X 
  1     .     X     X     X     1 
     .     X     1     X     X 
  1     1     X     1     .     X 
     1     1     1     .     1 
  1     1     1     1     .     1 
     1     .     1     .     . 
  H     .     .     1     .     . 
     H     .     .     1     1 
        H     .     .     1 
           X     .     . 
              X     H 
                 X 
 
The above output shows the status at the last iteration for a neighborhood 
distance of 5.  Note that the training factor and the average change are both 
minute.  The above output was to the screen for real-time monitoring.  A log file 
was also created  
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Iteration 476 distance 0 
alpha 0.000826913829579694. 
This iteration lasted 0.0147421836853027 minutes. 
Average change = 0.000338512549388827. 
BMN changes:  0.  Max BMI:  326 
 
                 X 
              X     X 
           X     X     X 
        X     X     X     X 
     X     X     X     X     . 
  X     X     X     X     X     X 
     X     X     X     .     1 
  1     X     1     X     .     X 
     X     X     .     X     X 
  X     X     X     .     1     X 
     1     X     1     X     1 
  X     X     X     X     X     X 
     X     X     X     X     X 
  X     1     X     X     X     X 
     X     X     1     X     X 
  X     X     X     1     1     X 
     X     X     X     .     . 
        X     X     X     H 
           X     X     X 
              1     X 
                 H 
Elapsed time:  31.7587482492129 minutes. 
 
The above output shows the status when the SOM training stopped.  Note 
the total elapsed time of approximately 32 minutes which is substantially less 
than the 6-day training time of 1D ANNaBell and the 2-day training time of 3D 
ANNaBell.  The speed is attributed to a more focused data set, enhanced 
automatic training monitoring, optimized code, and better hardware.  The training 
time could probably be further reduced by using a compiled programming 
language such as C instead of Perl.  A log file was also created during the 
training with a somewhat different focus on the progress of the training. 
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359 distance 3, Eta 0.000397011669280822:  
0.00697095083557402 average change, (10 biggest at 
0.03585063519038). 
360 distance 3, Eta 0.000408922019359247:  
0.00572748632108736 average change, (10 biggest at 
0.0296745465177702). 
361 distance 3, Eta 0.000204461009679623:  
0.00684703722906379 average change, (44 biggest at 
0.0623563975424632). 
 
Above is a three-line example from the log file output.  The first line shows 
that for iteration 359, the neighborhood distance was 3 and the training factor 
was 0.000397011669280822.  The average change was 0.00697095083557402 
and Node 10 had the biggest change at 0.03585063519038.  One can see that 
the average change increased from Iteration 360 to Iteration 361 so the training 
factor was reduced by 50 percent, at which time Node 44 had the biggest change 
instead of Node 10.  This information can be used by the knowledge engineer to 
monitor the status of the training. 
EXAMINING THE SOM 
Once the SOM has been trained, it needs to be examined in order to see 
the results of the training.  What changes during the SOM training is the location 
of the nodes,   , in multidimensional space moving towards the locations of the 
input vectors,   , in the same multidimensional space.  The closest node to an 
input vector is the BMN.  Similarly, the closest input vectors to a node are the 
BMI.  At the end of the training, various nodes are in proximity to various clusters 
of input vectors, while other nodes may be in between clusters of input vectors.  
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Figure 34, Node Training Movement 
Figure 34 shows how the nodes moved to accommodate the 10 special 
vectors during training.  The left meta-hexagon uses arrows to indicate 
movement from the starting positions.  The right meta-hexagon shows the labels 
for the ending positions after the training.  The most extreme vectors were in the 
upper right of the meta-hexagon after the training.  Although it appears that the 
maximum value for tcp_rat, for example, moved from Node 80 to Node 63, it was 
actually nodes 80 and 63 (and all of the other nodes) which did the moving in 
multidimensional space.  The data in the trained SOM can be analyzed many 
different ways. 
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Figure 35, Preliminary SOM Analysis 
Figure 35 shows a variety of preliminary analyses on the SOM results 
which were created using a spreadsheet.  Yellow represents the lowest values, 
with green, blue, purple, and red representing increasingly higher values.  The 
node with the highest value in each case is boxed in black.  The Distance from 
origin meta-hexagon shows the origin in yellow on the lower right with vector 
spaces then located off to the left and then up to the right, with the furthest node 
from the origin being in the upper right.  The ip_count graphic generally shows 
lower values around the edges moving in to the highest value in the upper 
center.  The tot_count, uniq_ports, tcp_rat, and bytes graphics generally show 
high values in the upper right.  The uniq_aliens graphic shows high points in the 
upper right, but also in the middle left.  The port_ave graphic shows higher 
values in the upper left.  BMI counts shows where most of the input vectors are 
located in the map:  generally on the lower left side.  U-matrix indicates average 
distances between neighboring nodes:  the nodes on the bottom and the left are 
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closer together while the nodes in the upper right are furthest apart.  For a full-
color graphic, uniq_aliens, port_ave, and tcp_rat appear to have varying and 
distinctive patterns which blended together should produce a map showing 
higher level patterns. 
 
Figure 36, SOM Maps 
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Figure 36 shows a variety of SOM maps from this training which were 
created with custom Python [100] script.  These maps take longer to create, but 
provide more detail than the spreadsheet graphics shown previously.  
Logarithmic values were used in the U-matrix meta-hexagon because otherwise 
only one hexagon could be seen.  The U-matrix graphic generally indicates that 
nodes are close together around the bottom and left edges and are extremely far 
apart in the upper right.  The next seven meta-hexagons show the intensities of 
the values for each of the seven dimensions in the vectors.  Solid black 
hexagons represent the locations of the maximum values.  The primary colors of 
red, green, and blue are used for tcp_rat, port_ave, and uniq_aliens because this 
helps to visualize how the values of these dimensions are blended to create the 
Blend meta-hexagon, which shows the most information of any of the graphics in 
this group. 
 
Figure 37, Alternate Blends 
Figure 37 shows three example alternate ways of blending the data for 
full-color display.  Alternate Blend A used uniq_aliens as red, port_ave as green, 
and tcp_rat as blue.  Alternate Blend B used port_ave as red, tcp_rat as green, 
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and uniq_aliens as blue.  Alternate Blend C used tot_count as red, port_ave as 
green, and uniq_ports as blue.  The objective with trying these different blends is 
to find the blend that best illustrates the distribution of the data by the SOM. 
DANGER AND SAFE ZONES 
Self-training in the context of this research means that the SOM was 
unaware of what input vectors originated from known infected computers and 
what input vectors originated from computers believed to be uninfected.  The 
SOM trained itself with raw unlabeled data not knowing what data represented 
good network traffic and what data represented bad network traffic. In order to be 
useful for information security, it is necessary to determine if the SOM 
successfully distinguished between pertinent types of network traffic.  Unlike 1D 
ANNaBell and 3D ANNaBell where each IP address was represented by a single 
node, LLNIDS ANNaBell was trained with moving windows of temporal network 
traffic, so numerous nodes can represent a single IP address, making 
visualization and analysis more complex. 
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Figure 38, Blackhole Exploit Pack Example 
Figure 38 is a an example comparing an office desktop known to be 
infected with the Blackhole Exploit Pack with another office desktop believed to 
be uninfected.  The samples were taken while each computer was connected to 
INetSim, and each sample is approximately two minutes long.  The BMN for the 
uninfected computer started with Node 53, marked with an X, moved to Node 82 
as marked with an arrow, and then alternated between nodes 53 and 82.  (Refer 
to a previous graphic to review the node numbering system, if desired.)  The 
infected computer began with Node 44, marked with a Y, and then moved in 
sequence to nodes 24, 3, 13, 2, 10, 70, 69, and 70. 
Other infected computers matched other nodes and other uninfected 
computers also matched other nodes, with some infected and uninfected 
computers sometimes matching the same nodes.  An enormous number of 
variables are involved such as the type of operating system, whether the 
computer is on a domain, if a computer is doing automatic updating, how the 
computer has been used in the past, how the computer is currently being used, 
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what other software is installed on the computer, what else is happening on a 
network, how a computer is configured, and the available bandwidth.  An infected 
computer should be doing much of the same network activity as an uninfected 
computer, but will also be communicating with its controller and should also be 
participating in additional activity such as scanning the network, attacking other 
computers, sending spam, uploading information, downloading additional 
malware, or other activities as instructed by its controller. 
 
Figure 39, Normal Usage Examples 
Figure 39 shows examples of normal usage of computers connected to 
the Internet.  X is a student laptop booting, browsing, and shutting down.  Y is an 
office desktop idling.  Z is an office desktop being heavily used.  In this graphic, 
continuous lines are shown instead of arrows; the timelines start at the X, Y, and 
Z labels. 
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Figure 40, Special Examples 
In Figure 40, X is the subnet of a computer lab connected to the Internet; 
Y is a computer running a YouTube video; and Z is surfing of a pornography web 
site (which was considered to be uninfected traffic because the computer used 
was not believed to be infected).  X and Y in these cases are examples of when 
a BMN did not change over time. 
 
Figure 41, Malicious Examples 
In Figure 41, X was a laptop which set off an alarm for probing the network 
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with network discovery software, a borderline situation of malicious behavior.  Y 
was a computer infected with TDSS/TDL4.  Since an infected computer will also 
have normal network traffic, the nodes of the SOM representing only infected or 
only uninfected traffic are not readily apparent by looking at the figures displayed, 
so far.  In order to more accurately determine the nature of the traffic depicted by 
the various nodes, a histogram was created of the BMN counts for both infected 
and uninfected computer traffic.  In some cases, a node represented only 
infected traffic or uninfected traffic.  In the remaining cases a ratio was created of 
the amount of infected traffic that a node represented. 
 
Figure 42, Danger/Safe Zones 
Figure 42 displays the danger and safe zone of the map according to the 
type of traffic that the nodes represent.  The red nodes (for stop) have BMI of 
traffic of only infected computers, the green nodes (for go) have BMI of only 
traffic of uninfected computers, and the yellow nodes (for caution) have BMI of 
both types of traffic.  These zones can be used to show symptoms of infections. 
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Figure 43, Major Red/Green Zones 
Figure 43 shows the three major zones superimposed on the blended 
map.  The Green Zone is the largest contiguous area where the traffic of infected 
computers did not have a BMN.  The Red Light Zone is the largest danger zone 
which also has the most extreme vector values.  The Moderate Red Zone has 
less extreme vector values.  The blended color scheme and zones indicate that 
the node vectors in these areas can be interpreted both for fuzzy inference and 
also for danger/safe signals. 
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Figure 44, 3D Full-Color SOM with Major Zones 
Figure 44 shows a 3D full color representation of the SOM, created with 
Art of Illusion [92], with the nodes in the red zones indicated by red triangles and 
nodes in the Green Zone indicated by green asterisks.  The heights are 
logarithms of the U-matrix values, meaning that the vectors of the nodes 
represented by lower hexagons are close together and the vectors of the nodes 
represented by higher hexagons are extremely far apart from each other in 
multidimensional space.  The colors of the hexagons are based on their heights, 
generally with shades of green indicating lower elevations and shades of brown 
indicating higher elevations.  The area around the meta-hexagon is blue. 
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EXAMINING THE LLNIDS FIS 
The Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) was based on these ranges for the 
dimensions:  ip_count, 0 to 3.756307952; tot_count, 0 to 11592.18606; 
uniq_aliens, 0 to 34.40384547; uniq_ports, o to 80.90343139 ; port_ave, 0 to 
28071.80605; tcp_rat, 0 to 0.996178223; and, bytes, 0 to 9596203.858 (values 
extremely close to 0 were rounded to 0).  A goal of this research was to automate 
the creation of the fuzzy categories instead of creating them manually as was 
done with 3D ANNaBell.  Experience has shown that extreme values are 
important in categorizing network activity, therefore, these equally spaced 
categories were chosen including very low and very high values:  very low (VL), 
low, medium (med), high, and very high (VH). 
Table 18, LLNIDS ANNaBell Fuzzy Values 
 
Table 18 shows the FIS results.  The Green Zone, for example, had 
ip_count values from low to very high; the tot_count values were mixed; the 
uniq_aliens counts were from very low to low; the uniq_ports counts were from 
very low to high; the port_ave values were from low to very high; the tcp_rat 
values were from medium to very high; and, the byte counts were mixed. 
APPLYING LLNIDS AIS DANGER THEORY 
Separate IMNB data put aside for       was used to test the new system.  
      included sample network traffic from the computer used in a previous 
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example which set off an alarm for probing the network.  The network discovery 
software which was found on this computer was disabled and additional input 
data was created from the resulting network traffic in order to compare it with the 
previous traffic from the same computer while it was known to be probing.  
 
Figure 45, Example Test Map 
Figure 45 displays the network traffic node pattern of the probing 
computer after the network discovery software was disabled.  The previous 
pattern was in the vicinity of the Moderate Red Zone and this has changed.  The 
new pattern includes nodes mostly outside of the main zones, but also includes a 
single red node (marked with a red asterisk (*)) and two nodes in the Green 
Zone.  This sample represents approximately 22 minutes of network activity. 
The Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) shown previously for 3D ANNaBell 
along with SJ Fusion could be used provide an indication of the danger, if any, of 
this test data, but this would be considerably more complex with multiple nodes 
involved (with 3D ANNaBell, only a single node was involved in the FIS 
calculation).  Instead, using the ratio of infected traffic that each node represents 
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in order to create danger and safe signals as input to the Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
(DCA) from Artificial Immune System Danger Theory (AISDT) is a much more 
direct method of getting an indication of any possible danger. 
Table 19, Danger/Safe Signals over Time 
Time 
Series BMN 
Danger 
Signal 
Safe 
Signal   CSM Danger Safe Alert 
1 5 0.00 0.94   1.41 -1.41 0.94   
2 17 0.00 1.00   2.91 -2.91 1.94   
3 88 0.00 0.77   4.07 -4.07 2.71   
4 89 0.00 0.73   5.16 -5.16 3.44   
5 89 0.00 0.73   6.26 -6.26 4.17   
6 89 0.00 0.73   7.35 -7.35 4.90   
7 0 0.80 0.00   7.75 -6.95 4.90   
8 90 0.00 0.86   9.04 -8.24 5.76   
9 90 0.00 0.86   10.33 -9.53 6.62 Safe 
10 82 0.65 0.00   0.33 0.33 0.00   
11 82 0.65 0.00   0.65 0.65 0.00   
12 82 0.65 0.00   0.98 0.98 0.00   
13 82 0.65 0.00   1.30 1.30 0.00   
14 82 0.65 0.00   1.63 1.63 0.00   
15 82 0.65 0.00   1.95 1.95 0.00   
16 72 0.89 0.00   2.40 2.40 0.00   
17 73 1.00 0.00   2.90 2.90 0.00   
18 73 1.00 0.00   3.40 3.40 0.00   
19 73 1.00 0.00   3.90 3.90 0.00   
20 73 1.00 0.00   4.40 4.40 0.00   
21 85 0.69 0.00   4.74 4.74 0.00   
22 85 0.69 0.00   5.09 5.09 0.00   
23 87 0.61 0.00   5.39 5.39 0.00   
24 87 0.61 0.00   5.70 5.70 0.00   
25 87 0.61 0.00   6.00 6.00 0.00   
26 87 0.61 0.00   6.31 6.31 0.00   
27 72 0.89 0.00   6.75 6.75 0.00   
28 72 0.89 0.00   7.20 7.20 0.00   
29 72 0.89 0.00   7.64 7.64 0.00   
30 72 0.89 0.00   8.09 8.09 0.00   
31 72 0.89 0.00   8.53 8.53 0.00   
32 72 0.89 0.00   8.98 8.98 0.00   
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Table 19 (Continued) 
33 72 0.89 0.00   9.42 9.42 0.00   
34 61 0.00 1.00   10.92 7.92 1.00 Danger 
35 62 0.00 1.00   1.50 -1.50 1.00   
36 62 0.00 1.00   3.00 -3.00 2.00   
37 62 0.00 1.00   4.50 -4.50 3.00   
38 62 0.00 1.00   6.00 -6.00 4.00   
39 62 0.00 1.00   7.50 -7.50 5.00   
40 61 0.00 1.00   9.00 -9.00 6.00   
41 90 0.00 0.86   10.29 -10.29 6.86 Safe 
42 72 0.89 0.00   0.45 0.45 0.00   
43 72 0.89 0.00   0.89 0.89 0.00   
44 72 0.89 0.00   1.34 1.34 0.00   
45 72 0.89 0.00   1.78 1.78 0.00   
46 72 0.89 0.00   2.23 2.23 0.00   
47 72 0.89 0.00   2.67 2.67 0.00   
48 72 0.89 0.00   3.12 3.12 0.00   
49 72 0.89 0.00   3.56 3.56 0.00   
50 72 0.89 0.00   4.01 4.01 0.00   
51 72 0.89 0.00   4.45 4.45 0.00   
52 72 0.89 0.00   4.90 4.90 0.00   
53 72 0.89 0.00   5.34 5.34 0.00   
54 72 0.89 0.00   5.79 5.79 0.00   
55 72 0.89 0.00   6.23 6.23 0.00   
56 72 0.89 0.00   6.68 6.68 0.00   
57 72 0.89 0.00   7.12 7.12 0.00   
58 72 0.89 0.00   7.57 7.57 0.00   
59 72 0.89 0.00   8.01 8.01 0.00   
60 82 0.65 0.00   8.34 8.34 0.00   
61 82 0.65 0.00   8.66 8.66 0.00   
62 82 0.65 0.00   8.99 8.99 0.00   
63 89 0.00 1.00   10.49 7.49 1.00 Danger 
64 89 0.00 0.73   1.10 -1.10 0.73   
65 89 0.00 0.73   2.19 -2.19 1.46   
66 89 0.00 0.73   3.29 -3.29 2.19   
67 89 0.00 0.73   4.38 -4.38 2.92   
68 89 0.00 0.73   5.48 -5.48 3.65   
69 90 0.00 0.86   6.77 -6.77 4.51   
70 90 0.00 0.86   8.06 -8.06 5.37   
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Table 19 (Continued) 
71 90 0.00 0.86   9.35 -9.35 6.23   
72 72 0.89 0.00   9.79 -8.90 6.23 Safe 
73 72 0.89 0.00   0.45 0.45 0.00   
74 72 0.89 0.00   0.89 0.89 0.00   
75 72 0.89 0.00   1.34 1.34 0.00   
76 72 0.89 0.00   1.78 1.78 0.00   
77 72 0.89 0.00   2.23 2.23 0.00   
78 72 0.89 0.00   2.67 2.67 0.00   
79 72 0.89 0.00   3.12 3.12 0.00   
80 72 0.89 0.00   3.56 3.56 0.00   
81 72 0.89 0.00   4.01 4.01 0.00   
82 72 0.89 0.00   4.45 4.45 0.00   
83 72 0.89 0.00   4.90 4.90 0.00   
84 82 0.65 0.00   5.22 5.22 0.00   
85 82 0.65 0.00   5.55 5.55 0.00   
86 82 0.65 0.00   5.87 5.87 0.00   
87 82 0.65 0.00   6.20 6.20 0.00   
88 82 0.65 0.00   6.52 6.52 0.00   
89 82 0.65 0.00   6.85 6.85 0.00   
90 72 0.89 0.00   7.29 7.29 0.00   
91 72 0.89 0.00   7.74 7.74 0.00   
92 72 0.89 0.00   8.18 8.18 0.00   
93 72 0.89 0.00   8.63 8.63 0.00   
94 72 0.89 0.00   9.07 9.07 0.00   
95 72 0.89 0.00   9.52 9.52 0.00   
96 72 0.89 0.00   9.96 9.96 0.00   
97 72 0.89 0.00   10.41 10.41 0.00 Danger 
98 72 0.89 0.00   0.45 0.45 0.00   
99 72 0.89 0.00   0.89 0.89 0.00   
100 72 0.89 0.00   1.34 1.34 0.00   
101 72 0.89 0.00   1.78 1.78 0.00   
102 72 0.89 0.00   2.23 2.23 0.00   
103 72 0.89 0.00   2.67 2.67 0.00   
104 72 0.89 0.00   3.12 3.12 0.00   
105 72 0.89 0.00   3.56 3.56 0.00   
106 72 0.89 0.00   4.01 4.01 0.00   
107 72 0.89 0.00   4.45 4.45 0.00   
108 72 0.89 0.00   4.90 4.90 0.00   
109 82 0.65 0.00   5.22 5.22 0.00   
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Table 19, (Continued) 
110 89 0.00 0.73   6.32 4.13 0.73   
111 89 0.00 0.73   7.41 3.03 1.46   
112 89 0.00 0.73   8.51 1.94 2.19   
113 89 0.00 0.73   9.60 0.84 2.92   
114 89 0.00 0.73   10.70 -0.25 3.65 Safe 
115 89 0.00 0.73   1.10 -1.10 0.73   
116 89 0.00 0.73   2.19 -2.19 1.46   
117 89 0.00 0.73   3.29 -3.29 2.19   
118 90 0.00 0.86   4.58 -4.58 3.05   
119 90 0.00 0.86   5.87 -5.87 3.91   
120 90 0.00 0.86   7.16 -7.16 4.77   
121 90 0.00 0.86   8.45 -8.45 5.63   
122 90 0.00 0.86   9.74 -9.74 6.49   
123 72 0.89 0.00   10.18 -9.29 6.49 Safe 
124 72 0.89 0.00   0.45 0.45 0.00   
125 72 0.89 0.00   0.89 0.89 0.00   
126 72 0.89 0.00   1.34 1.34 0.00   
127 72 0.89 0.00   1.78 1.78 0.00   
128 72 0.89 0.00   2.23 2.23 0.00   
129 72 0.89 0.00   2.67 2.67 0.00   
130 72 0.89 0.00   3.12 3.12 0.00   
131 72 0.89 0.00   3.56 3.56 0.00   
 
Table 19 shows the derivations of the danger and safe signals for the 
example over time.  Each line is a one-minute moving window of network traffic 
and the lines are spaced 10 seconds apart.  The first column is the sequence 
number of the time series.  The second column shows the BMN for that time slot.  
The next two columns show the danger signal or the safe signal for the 
corresponding BMN based on the ratio of infected/uninfected BMI for that node.  
If the ratio is higher for infected traffic, then the ratio becomes the danger signal 
for that time slot and the cell is highlighted in red; if the ratio is higher for 
uninfected traffic, then the ratio become the safe signal for that time slot and the 
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cell is highlighted in green.  These calculations ignore any possible inflammation 
and Pathogen-Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP) inputs (Snort alerts).  The 
column labeled CSM is for the co-stimulation signal and keeps track of the 
amount of stimulus for an alert.  When the CSM reaches a threshold, 10 in this 
example, then an alert is produced.  The columns labeled Danger and Safe 
accumulate the danger and safe signals until the threshold is reached.  The last 
column, labeled Alert, shows when an alert is issued and whether the alert is for 
danger or safety.  The calculations highlighted in yellow represent a single 
artificial dendritic cell accumulating danger and safe signals, reaching a 
threshold, and then reporting the status (safe in this case) to the body.  This table 
shows the calculations of 9 such artificial dendritic cells in sequential order, 5 
reporting safe conditions, 3 reporting dangerous conditions, and one (the last 
one) not yet reporting.  Multiple CSM/Danger/Alert calculations could be 
occurring in parallel, with a new set being started with each new line.  The 
formulas for these calculations were provided earlier in this paper.  This AIS 
Danger Theory analysis indicates that the subject computer was alternating 
between safe activity and suspicious activity, indicating that a follow up would be 
appropriate to see if this computer had an additional problem besides the 
network discovery software.  This analysis also indicates the times during the 
traffic when a forensics analyst should look for the additional problematic activity.  
The computer was no longer available, however, when this was determined.  An 
added benefit of this method is that the analysis can be done in real time 
indicating when the suspicious network traffic is occurring, which would allow a 
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technician to observe via Task Manager or other software what program is active 
while the suspicious traffic is taking place. 
 
Figure 46, Parallel Danger/Safe Signals 
Figure 46 shows how the danger and safe alerts could be produced in 
parallel with a new artificial dendritic cell starting at each line.  Additional columns 
were added to the previous table for the calculations of these additional dendritic 
cells.  The yellow cells indicate the upper left corner of each new dendritic cell.  
The threshold was set to 3 for this figure in order to produce a smaller graphic.  
In this sample spreadsheet of the calculations, the next dendritic cell, for Time 9, 
would start off the page to the right.  Eight dendritic cells are shown in this figure, 
each of them reporting safe conditions.  Producing alerts in parallel such as this 
would provide faster and more detailed information to the security technician in 
real time.  The concept level has changed to artificial dendritic cells indicating 
danger and safety in network traffic. 
This system facilitates Type 1 Intrusion Detection by creating real-time 
alerts of network patterns which are known to be malicious.  This system also 
facilitates Type 2 Intrusion Detection by creating real-time alerts of network 
patterns which are similar to (symptoms of) network patterns which appear to be 
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malicious.  By indicating network patterns which are similar to other network 
patterns which are similar to malicious behavior, this system is also a benefit to 
Type 3 NID Research by providing potential ways of detecting intrusions that are 
currently not being detected.  New Snort rules could be created as a result of 
using this system to monitor network traffic during times when danger signals are 
being produced. 
 
Figure 47, Real-Time Monitoring 
Figure 47 is a dramatization of how the Invisible Mobile Network Bridge 
(IMNB) could be used for live monitoring with the trained SOM hybridized with 
AIS Danger Theory.  Software could be developed to run on the IMNB (left) 
which would indicate the BMN in real time and flash danger alerts as they occur.  
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A security technician could take advantage of this system to use Task Manager 
or other analysis software to determine what processes are active on the subject 
computer (right) while the suspicious traffic is known to be occurring.  Results 
from live analyses such as this could be used to create new Snort rules. 
AN EVOLVING SOM 
An advantage of using               as the basis for the training factor is 
that the already trained SOM can evolve with new input data without having to 
start over with the training.  The only existing SOM information which needs to be 
retained is the counts of the BMI for each node plus labeling information for each 
type of network traffic used as input.  To continue training, use one iteration per 
neighborhood distance per new input vector with the inverse of               as 
the training factor as explained earlier.  The initial neighborhood distance could 
also start at a smaller size.  Cascading calculations based on the SOM vector 
values would also need to be recalculated as appropriate.  As the SOM gets 
exceedingly large with BMI, the BMI counts can be periodically fractionally 
reduced in order to limit long term memory of the SOM.  As the SOM 
substantially changes or grows, it can periodically be retrained, and can 
potentially become a growing hierarchical SOM [63]. 
An advantage of the LLNIDS SOM is that the data can be collected under 
tightly controlled conditions.  The LLNIDS SOM could be expanded into a 
universal SOM for broader application by obtaining input from pcap repositories 
which are available on the Internet.  Here are a couple of example repositories: 
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 http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/networkminer/index.php?title
=Publicly_available_PCAP_files 
 https://www.openpacket.org/capture/list 
A common infection is FakeAV and a sample of FakeAV network traffic is 
available at openpacket.org.  This sample can be converted to text with tcpdump 
which can then be normalized and aggregated into input vectors for the SOM.  
Here are the first three lines from the text of the FakeAV file showing that all of 
the necessary information is available to create SOM input from this data: 
21:02:03.865392 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 127, id 0, 
offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 67) 
12.183.1.55.54226 > 8.8.8.8.53: 11851+ A? 
puskovayaustanovka.ru. (39) 
21:02:04.051015 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 53, id 
47400, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), 
length 83) 8.8.8.8.53 > 12.183.1.55.54226: 11851 
1/0/0 puskovayaustanovka.ru. A 46.161.20.66 (55) 
21:02:04.052874 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 
41435, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), 
length 44) 12.183.1.55.44385 > 46.161.20.66.80: 
S, cksum 0x573b (correct), 
3572979361:3572979361(0) win 5840 <mss 1460> 
 
Other samples of both normal and malicious traffic are also available.  The 
concept level has changed to a theoretical evolving universal hybridized 
SOM/FIS/AISDT intrusion detection system.  
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CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION 
In this research, six years of experience was gained doing intrusion 
detection on the information security team of central Information Technology for 
the University.  The literature was reviewed for information security noting the 
complexity of intrusion detection.  The literature for Soft Computing methods of 
intrusion detection was reviewed for ways of overcoming this complexity.  A lack 
of analytical descriptions of data and intrusion detection types in the literature 
was noted during these reviews of the literature. 
Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) were studied as a possible solution and 1D 
ANNaBell, a SOM, was created and placed into production for the University for 
network intrusion detection.  1D ANNaBell successfully found Storm Worm 
infections and other network security problems being the first known time that a 
self-trained computational intelligence discovered previously unknown feral 
malicious software. 
3D ANNaBell, a SOM hybridized with a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS), 
was created as an evolution from 1D ANNaBell.  3D ANNaBell produced a full-
color 3D map with landscape features that was useful in forensics, profiling of 
networks, and in understanding the SOM. 
A high-level overall SOM+ diagnostic system was created to join several 
components of intrusion detection together, much like a medical center where 
numerous diagnostic methods are utilized in decision-making.  Based on the 
concept of a Local Landline Network Intrusion Detection System (LLNIDS), an 
Invisible Mobile Network Bridge (IMNB) was created to collect data; the LLNIDS 
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Types of Intrusion Detection were defined, the LLNIDS Computational Model was 
created, and the LLNIDS hybridized SOM/FIS/AISDT network analysis system 
was invented. 
The LLNIDS SOM includes dynamic methods of changing the 
neighborhood sizes and of determining the training factors.  A neighborhood size 
changes when the best matching nodes stop changing and the training factors 
are initially based on the number of best matching inputs for each neighborhood.  
The training factors then continue changing based on the amount of movement 
of the nodes.  These dynamic methods allow the creation of a live SOM that, 
once initially trained, can continue to train as new inputs are entered.  The 
LLNIDS SOM can also in theory be expanded to become a universal SOM with 
inputs from files of network traffic from other sources, such as from Internet 
repositories. 
The LLNIDS FIS helps to overcome the black box environment of the 
SOM by allowing security technicians to correlate fuzzy descriptions of types of 
network traffic with a full color 3D SOM.  This FIS, along with Svensson Josang 
(SJ) Fusion, can also be used to correlate findings with the AIS Danger Theory 
alerts. 
The LLNIDS AIS Danger Theory works in coordination with the LLNIDS 
SOM to produce parallel periodic alerts signifying dangerous or safe network 
traffic. 
The SOM+ system as a whole allows a security technician to take 
samples of network traffic for analysis or to monitor network traffic in real time.  
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Samples of infected computers can be taken while connected to the Internet or to 
a simulated network.  The network traffic can be profiled or monitored live to see 
when suspicious network traffic is occurring.  This can be correlated with 
observations of software which is running on a subject computer at the time of 
the suspicious traffic. 
 
Figure 48, SOM+ Diagnostic System 
Figure 48 summarizes the SOM+ Diagnostic System.  IMNB data is fed 
into the hybridized SOM/FIS/AIS while Snort data is also fed into the AISDT.  The 
SOM produces danger/safe signals read by the AISDT, re-trains itself in real 
time, and sends additional output to the FIS.  The AISDT creates artificial 
dendritic cells to aggregate signals and periodically send danger/safe alerts.  The 
FIS produces human intuitive output and also sends output to SJ Fusion.  The 
SOM/AISDT aspects can be used in forensics to create new Snort rules.  These 
components are all potentially part of a larger ensemble system consisting of 
other intrusion detection components which also send output to the SJ Fusion, 
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which produces a single output.  The danger/safe signals can be separate output 
or can be sent to SJ Fusion to become part of a single output.  The entire system 
is based on a foundation of ID Types and the Computational Model.  The system 
detects Type 1 and Type 2 intrusions with type 1 and 2 methods and alerts.  This 
is type 1, 2, and 3 research:  it improves types 1 and 2 intrusion detection and 
potentially detects Type 3 intrusions by comparing similarities of network traffic 
with similarities of known types of dangerous network traffic. 
 
Figure 49, The Larger Structure 
Figure 49 illustrates how the SOM/FIS/AISDT hybrid from the previous 
figure can drop into the larger generic structure of the diagnostic system.  The 
SOM+ Diagnostic System is modular because the various components can be 
developed and/or programmed independently, yet they work cohesively.  The 
SOM+ Diagnostic System is multitaskable because it can be used to collect data, 
on collected data, or for live analysis.  It can be multitasked for detection 
capability, profiling, or forensics.  AIS Danger Theory, unlike traditional AIS, is 
efficient and can be adjusted for scalability.  The LLNIDS SOM scales well for 
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live retraining because of the dynamic methods of changing neighborhood sizes 
and training factors.  The 3D full color SOM map coupled with FIS facilitates 
intuitive understanding by security technicians.  The red and green zones on a 
live map along with danger and safe alerts also facilities intuitiveness.  The 
dynamic methods of the LLNIDS SOM allow for adaptability to quickly changing 
scenarios.  Periodic full retraining of the SOM needs either time or a high 
performance computing environment or can potentially be mitigated with a 
growing hierarchical SOM [63].  The Invisible Mobile Network Bridge can be a 
simple laptop to monitor a single system up to a high performance system to 
monitor a network, depending upon the needs of the system. 
Advantages of the SOM+ Diagnostic System are: 
 The full color 3D SOM is more intuitive than previous maps. 
 AIS Danger Theory signals can provide real-time alerts and 
forensics information. 
 The FIS presents a more intuitive SOM interface for security 
technicians. 
 Newly defined intrusion types aid scientific analysis. 
 The computational model unifies how the data is presented in 
numerous concept levels and methods. 
 The IMNB allows more pure captures of network traffic without 
potential influence by malware and aids in forensics. 
 The IMNB can be set up for data capture without disturbing a 
running subject computer. 
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 The IMNB can monitor a subject computer on a simulated network 
so that an infected computer does not need to endanger a real 
network for data collection. 
 Data collected from the IMNB can also be analyzed by other kinds 
of software such as Snort and Wireshark. 
 The system can potentially become a universal SOM by accepting 
network traffic data from repositories on the Internet. 
 The system is modular, multitaskable, scales well, is adaptable to 
quickly changing scenarios, and uses relatively few resources. 
 Emergence. 
Disadvantages of the SOM+ Diagnostic System are: 
 Re-training the SOM as it grows large will take considerably more 
resources. 
 The expertise of a knowledge engineer is required. 
Novelties in this research are: 
 The complex hybridization of SOM, FIS, and AIS Danger Theory. 
 Automated changing of neighborhood sizes and the training factor 
in the SOM. 
 The IMNB for data collection and network monitoring. 
 The computational model. 
 The new intrusion detection types. 
 A diagnostic system based on a medical center metaphor. 
 Combining clustering and classification in the SOM. 
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 The Imprecision Principle. 
 Listing the numerous concept levels involved in processing data 
from binary network traffic to sophisticated Soft Computing 
methods. 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
Information security is a complex and inexact process which lends itself to 
Soft Computing techniques.  Current methods are stymied by continuously 
evolving malware techniques and the situation that determination of a virus in all 
cases is undecidable.  Network security is an evolutionary system where both 
sides continually evolve to outwit the other side.  Security technicians are not 
capable of knowing what every single packet on the Internet is doing.  This 
research showed that Soft Computing methods can successfully be used in 
addition to other methods for intrusion detection.  The SOM 1D ANNaBell 
discovered previously unknown network security problems.  The SOM 3D 
ANNaBell with FIS demonstrated that the black box internal workings of the SOM 
can be displayed more intuitively for security technicians and that the system can 
be used for security profiling and forensics.  The SOM/FIS/AISDT hybrid showed 
that artificially immunity danger theory can be hybridized with the SOM to 
produce danger and safe signals for security technicians in real time for live 
analysis, as well as for profiling, forensics, and intrusion detection, in a manner 
which can potentially be evolving and universal. 
Like the situation with Lewis and Clark when they headed West in 1804 to 
see just how large the Louisiana Purchase really was: there is a huge amount of 
unexplored territory in Soft Computing to be investigated. The SOM+ Diagnostic 
System in this research is an archetype from which to move forth. 
  
144 
 
 
REFERENCES 
1. U.S. Air Force: Cyberspace Operations. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12 
(2010) 
2. Amoroso, E.: Intrusion Detection: An Introduction to Internet Surveillance, 
Correlation, Trace Back, Traps, and Response. Intrusion.Net Books 
(1999) 
3. Denning, D.: An Intrusion-Detection Model. IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering 13(2), 118-131 (1986) 
4. Young, C.: Taxonomy of Computer Virus Defense Mechanisms. In : The 
10th National Computer Security Conference Proceedings (1987) 
5. Lunt, T.: Automated Audit Trail Analysis and Intrusion Detection: A Survey. 
In : Proceedings of the 11th National Computer Security Conference, 
Baltimore, pp.65-73 (1988) 
6. Lunt, T.: A Survey of Intrusion Detection Techniques. Computers and 
Security 12, 405-418 (1993) 
7. Vaccaro, H., Liepins, G.: Detection of Anomalous Computer Session 
Activity. In : Proceedings of the 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security 
and Privacy (1989) 
8. Helman, P., Liepins, G., Richards, W.: Foundations of Intrusion Detection. In 
: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop 
V (1992) 
9. Denault, M., Gritzalis, D., Karagiannis, D., Spirakis, P.: Intrusion Detection: 
Approach and Performance Issues of the SECURENET System. 
Computers and Security 13(6), 495-507 (1994) 
10. Forrest, S., Allen, L., Perelson, A., Cherukuri, R.: Self-Nonself 
Discrimination in a Computer. In : Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE 
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, Los Alamos, cA 
(1994) 
11. Crosbie, M., Spafford, G.: Defending A Computer System Using 
Autonomous Agents., COAST Laboratory, Department of Computer 
Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA (1994) 
145 
 
 
12. Kumar, S., Spafford, E.: An Application of Pattern Matching in Intrusion 
Detection., Purdue University (1994) 
13. Ilgun, K., Kemmerer, R., Porras, P.: State Transition Analysis: A Rule-Based 
Intrusion Detection Approach. IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering 21(3), 181-199 (March 1995) 
14. Esmaili, M., Safavi-Naini, R., Pieprzyk, J.: Evidential Reasoning in Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems. In : Proceedings of the First 
Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, 
pp.253-265 (1996) 
15. Debar, H., Dacier, M., Wespi, A.: Towards a Taxonomy of Intrusion-
Detection Systems. Computer Networks 31, 805-822 (1999) 
16. Bace, R.: Intrusion Detection. MacMillan Technical Publishing (2000) 
17. Marin-Blazquez, J., Perez, G.: Intrusion Detection Using a Linguistic 
Hedged Fuzzy-XCS Classifier System. Soft Computing -- A Fusion of 
Foundations, Methodologies, and Applications 13(3), 273-290 (2008) 
18. Lunt, T.: IDES: An Intelligent System for Detecting Intruders. In : 
Proceedings of Computer Security, Threat and Countermeasures 
(1990) 
19. Cannady, J.: Applying Neural Networks for Misuse Detection. In : 
Proceedings of the 21st National Information Systems Security 
Conference, pp.368-381 (1998) 
20. Kayacik, H., Zincir-Heywood, , Heywood, M.: Selecting Features for 
Intrusion Detection: A Feature Relevance Analysis on KDD 99 
Intrusion Detection Datasets. In : Proceedings of the Third Annual 
Conference on Privacy, Security, and Trust, St. Andrews, New 
Brunswick, Canada (2005) 
21. Lee, S., Heinbuch, D.: Training a Neural-Network Based Intrusion Detector 
to Recognize Novel Attacks. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, 
and Cybernetics, Part A, 294-299 (2001) 
22. Mukkamala, S., Janoski, G., Sung, A.: Monitoring System Security Using 
Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines. In : PRoceedings of 
the International Workshop on Hybrid Intelligent Systems, pp.121-138 
(2001) 
146 
 
 
23. Zhang, Z., Shen, H.: Application of Online Training SVMs for Real-Time 
Intrusion Detection with Different Considerations. Computer 
Communications 28(12), 1428-1442 (2005) 
24. LaRoche, P., Zincir-Heywood, : 802.11 De-authentication Attack Detection 
using Genetic Programming. In : Proceedings of the 9th European 
Conference on Genetic Programming, vol. 3905, pp.1-12 (2006) 
25. Livadas, C., Walsh, B., Lapsley, D., Strayer, T.: Using Machine Language 
Learning Techniques to Identify Botnet Traffic. In : Proceedings of the 
Second IEEE LCN Workshop on Network Security (WNS), Tampa, 
Florida, USA (2006) 
26. Mukkamala, S., Sung, A., Abraham, A.: Designing Intrusion Detection 
Systems: Architectures and Perspectives. The International 
Engineering Consortium (IEC) Annual Review of Communications 57, 
1229-1241 (2004) 
27. Mukkamala, S., Sung, A.: Identifying Key Features fo Intrusion Detection 
Using Neural Networks. In : Proceedings of the ICCC International 
Conference on Computer Communications, pp.1132-1138 (2002) 
28. Sung, A., Mukkamala, S.: Identifying Important Features for Intrusion 
Detection Using Suport Vector Machines and Neural Networks. In : 
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Applications and the 
Internet (SAINT 2003), pp.209-217 (2003) 
29. Abraham, A., Jain, R.: Soft Computing Models for Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems. In: Soft Computing Models for Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems. (Accessed 2004) Available at: 
http://arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/0405/0405046.pdf 
30. Chen, Y., Abraham, A., Yang, J.: Feature Deduction and Intrusion Detection 
using Flexible Neural Trees. In : Proceedings of the Second IEEE 
International Symposium on Neural Networks (ISNN 2005), pp.439-
446 (2005) 
31. Chimphlee, W., Abdullah, A., Sap, M., Chimphlee, S., Srinoy, S.: Integrating 
Genetic Algorithms and Fuzzy c-Means for Anomaly Detection. In : 
Proceedings of IEEE Indicon, Chennai, India (2005) 
32. Newsome, J., Karp, B., Song, D.: Paragraph: Thwarting Signature Learning 
by Training Maliciously. In Zamboni, D., Kruegel, C., eds. : 
Proceedings of Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 9th 
International Symposium, RAID 2006, Hamburg, Germany, vol. 4219, 
147 
 
 
pp.81-105 (2006) 
33. Cohen, F.: Computer Viruses: Theory and Experiments. Computers & 
Security 6(1), 22-35 (1987) 
34. Me, L.: A Genetic Algorithm as an Alternative Tool for Security Audit Trails 
Analysis. In : Proceedings of Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection 
(RAID '98), France (1998) 
35. Pietraszek, T.: Using Adaptive Alert Classification to Reduce False Positives 
in Intrusion Detection. In : Proceedings of Recent Advances in 
Intrusion Detection, 7th International Symposium, RAID 2004, Sophia 
Antipolis, France, vol. 3224, pp.102-124 (2004) 
36. Zhou, J., Heckman, M., Reynolds, B., Carlson, A., Bishop, M.: Modeling 
Network Intrusion Detection Alerts for Correlation. ACM Transactions 
on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 10(1), 1-31 (2007) 
37. Bolzoni, D., Crispo, B., Etalle, S.: ATLANTIDES: An Architecture for Alert 
Verification in Network Intrusion Detection Systems. In : Proceedings 
of the 21st Large Installation System Administration Conference 
(LISA '07) (2007) 
38. Zadeh, L.: History; BISC During 90's. In: BISC Program. (Accessed March 
3, 1994) Available at: http://www-
bisc.cs.berkeley.edu/BISCProgram/History.htm 
39. Bayes, T.: An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of 
Chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 
53, 370-418 (1763) 
40. McCulloch, W., Pitts, W.: A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in 
Nervous Activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5, 115-133 
(1943) 
41. Zadeh, L.: Fuzzy Sets. Information and Control 9, 338-353 (1965) 
42. Bedau, M., Humphreys, P.: Emergence: Contemporary Readings in 
Philosophy and Science. The MIT Press, Cambridge (2008) 
43. Zadeh, L.: Fuzzy Logic, Neural Networks, and Soft Computing. 
Communications of the ACM 37(3), 77-84 (1994) 
44. Zadeh, L.: Roles of Soft Computing and Fuzzy Logic in the Conception, 
Design and Deployment of Information/Intelligent Systems. In 
148 
 
 
Kaynak, O., Zadeh, L., Turksen, B., Rudas, I., eds. : Computational 
Intelligence: Soft Computing and Fuzzy-Neuro Integration with 
Applications 162. Springer (1998) 
45. Langin, C., Rahimi, S.: Soft Computing in Intrusion Detection: The State of 
the Art. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing 
1(2), 133-145 (2010) 
46. Depren, O., Topallar, M., Anarim, E., Ciliz, M.: An Intelligent Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) for Anomaly and Misuse Detection in 
Computer Networks. Expert Systems with Applications 29(4), 713-
722 (2005) 
47. Katar, C.: Combining Multiple Techniques for Intrusion Detection. 
International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security 
6(2B), 208-218 (2006) 
48. Mukkamala, S., Sung, A., Abraham, A.: Intrusion Detection Using Ensemble 
of Soft Computing Paradigms. In : Proceedings of the Third 
International Conference on Intelligent Systems Design and 
Applications, Advances in Soft Computing, pp.239-248 (2003) 
49. Svensson, H., Josang, A.: Correlation of Intrusion Alarms wth Subjective 
Logic. In : Proceedings of the Sixth Nordic Workshop on Secure IT 
Systems (NordSec 2001), Copenhagen, Denmark (2001) 
50. Greensmith, J., Aickelin, U., Cayzer, S.: Detecting Danger: The Dendritic 
Cell Algorithm. In : Robust Intelligent Systems. IGI Publishing (2008) 
51. Mukkamala, S., Sung, A., Abraham, A.: Intrusion Detection using an 
Ensemble of Intelligent Paradigms. Journal of Network and Computer 
Applications 28, 167-182 (2005) 
52. Langin, C., Zhou, H., Rahimi, S.: A Model to Use Denied Internet Traffic to 
Indirectly Discover Internal Network Security Problems. In : 
Proceedings of the First IEEE International Workshop on Information 
and Data Assurance, Austin, Texas, USA (2008) 
53. Langin, C., Zhou, H., Gupta, B., Rahimi, S., Sayeh, M.: A Self-Organizing 
Map and its Modeling for Discovering Malignant Network Traffic. In : 
Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational 
Intelligence in Cyber Security, Nashville, TN, USA (2009) 
54. Kohonen, T.: Self-Organizing Maps 30. Springer-Verlag, Berline Heidelberg 
New York (2001) 
149 
 
 
55. Langin, C., Che, D., Wainer, M., Rahimi, S.: Visualization of Network 
Security Traffic using Hexagonal Self-Organizing Maps. In : 
Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Computers and 
Their Applications in Industry and Engineering (CAINE-2009), San 
Franciso, CA, USA, pp.1-6 (2009) 
56. Langin, C., Che, D., Wainer, M., Rahimi, S.: SOM with Vulture Fest Model 
Discovers Feral Malware and Visually Profiles the Security of 
Subnets. Internation Journal of Computers and Their Applications 
(IJCA) 17(4), 241-249 (2010) 
57. Langin, C., Wainer, M., Rahimi, S.: ANNaBell Island: A 3D Color Hexagonal 
SOM for Visual Intrusion Detection. Internation Journal of Computer 
Science and Information Security 9(1), 1-7 (2011) 
58. Hoglund, A., Hatonen, K.: Computer Network User Behavior Visualization 
using Self-Organizing Maps. In : Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Artificial Neural Networks (ICANN), pp.899-904 
(1998) 
59. Ultsch, A., Siemon, H.: Kohonen's Self Organizing Feature Maps for 
Exploratory Data Analysis. In : Proceedings of the International 
Neural Network Conference (INNC '90), pp.205-308 (1990) 
60. Lichodzijewski, P., Zincir-Heywood, A., Heywood, M.: Host-Based Intrusion 
Detection Using Self-Organizing Maps. In : Proceedings of the IEEE 
World Congress on Computational Intelligence, International Joint 
Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN) (2002) 
61. Kayacik, G., Zincir-Heywood, A., Heywood, M.: On the Capability of an SOM 
Based Intrusion Detection System. In : Proceedings of the IEEE 
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, pp.1808-1813 
(2003) 
62. Ramadas, M., Ostermann, S., Tjaden, B.: Detecting Anomalous Network 
Traffic with Self-Organizing Maps. In Vigna, G., Jonsson, E., Kruegel, 
C., eds. : Proceedings of Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 6th 
International Symposiu, RAID, 2003, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, vol. 2820, 
pp.36-54 (2003) 
63. Vicente, D., Vellido, A.: Review of Hierarchical Models for Data Clustering 
and Visualization. Tendencias de la Mineria de Datos in Espana, Red 
Espanola de Mineria de Datos (2004) 
64. Tauriainen, A.: A Self-learning System for P2P Traffic Classification. 
150 
 
 
Helsinki University of Technology, Helsinki (2005) 
65. Wetmore, L., Zincir-Heywood, A., Heywood, M.: Training the SOFM 
Efficiently: An Example from Intrusion Detection. In : Proceedings of 
the IEEE International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, IJCNN 
2005, pp.1575-1580 (2005) 
66. Kayacik, H., Zincir-Heywood, A.: Using Self-Organizing Maps to Build an 
Attack Map for Forensic Analysis. In : Proceedings of the ACM 
International Conference on Privacy, Security, and Trust (PST 2006), 
pp.285-293 (2006) 
67. Bolzoni, D., Etalle, S., Hartel, P.: POSEIDON: A 2-Tier Anomaly-Based 
Network Intrusion Detection System. In : Proceedings of the Fourth 
IEEE International Workshop on Information Assurance (IWIA 2006) 
(2006) 
68. Bolzoni, D., Etalle, S.: Approaches in Anomaly-based Network Intrusion 
Detection. In : Intrusion Detection Systems. Springer (2008) 1-16 
69. Luo, J.: Mining Fuzzy Association Rules and Fuzzy Frequency Episodes for 
Intrusion Detection. International Journal of Intelligent Systems 15(8), 
687-704 (2000) 
70. Noel, S., Wijesekera, D., Youman, C.: Modern Intrusion Detection, Data 
Mining, and Degrees of Attack Guild. In : Applications of Data Mining 
in Computer Security. Kluwer (2002) 
71. Tillapart, P., Thumthawatworn, T., Santiprabhob, P.: Fuzzy Intrusion 
Detection System. Assumption University Journal of Technology (AU 
J.T.) 6(2), 109-114 (2002) 
72. Dasgupta, D., Gonzalez, F., Yallapu, K., Gomez, J., Yarramsettii, R.: CIDS: 
An Agent-Based Intrusion Detection System. Computers & Security 
24(5), 387-398 (2005) 
73. Wang, W., Daniels, T.: A Graph Based Approach Towards Network 
Forensics Analysis. ACM Transactions on Information and System 
Security 12(1) (2008) 
74. Su, M.-Y., Yu, G.-J., Lin, C.-Y.: A Real-Time Network Intrusion Detection 
System for Large-Scale Attacks Based on an Incremental Mining 
Approach. Computers & Security, 301-309 (2009) 
75. Tajbakhsh, A., Rahmati, M., Mirzaei, A.: Intrusion Detection using Fuzzy 
151 
 
 
Associate Rules. Applied Soft Computing 9, 462-469 (2009) 
76. Kim, J., Bentley, P.: An Evaluation of Negative Selection in an Artificial 
Immunce System for Network Intrusion Detection. In : Proceedings of 
the 2001 Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference, 
pp.1330-1337 (2001) 
77. Matzinger, P.: Tolerance, Danger, and the Extended Family. Annual Revue 
of Immunology 12, 991-1045 (1994) 
78. Aickelin, U., Cayzer, S.: The Danger Theory and Its Application to AIS. In : 
1st International Conference on AIS, pp.141-148 (2002) 
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL-2002-244.pdf 
(accessed 3/12/11). 
79. Powers, S., He, J.: A Hybrid Artificial Immune System and Self Organising 
Map for Network Intrusion Detection. Information Sciences 178(15), 
3024-3042 (2008) 
80. Fu, H., Li, X.: A Bio-Inspired Multi-Tissues Growing Algorithm for IDS Based 
on Danger Theory and Data Fields. In : Proceedings of The 7th World 
Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation, Chongqing, China 
(2008) 
81. Li, X., Fu, H., Huang, S.: Design of a Dendritic Cells Inspired Model Based 
on Danger Theory for Intrusion Detection. In : Proceedings of the 
IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control 
(ICNSC 2008), pp.1137-1141 (2008) 
82. Dasgupta, D., Nino, L.: Immunological Computation. CRC Press (2009) 
83. Wu, S., Banzhaf, W.: The Use of Computational Intelligence in Intrusion 
Detection Systems: A Review. Applied Soft Computing 10(1), 1-35 
(July 2010) 
84. Kulis, A., Rahimi, S., Lee, Y.-C.: Finding Danger using Fuzzy Dendritic 
Cells. In : Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Workshop on Hybrid 
Intelligent Models and Applications, Paris, France (2011) 
85. Tcpdump/Libpcap: Tcpdump/Libpcap Public Repository. In: Tcpdump.org. 
Available at: http://www.tcpdump.org/ 
86. Chebrolu, S., Abraham, A., Thomas, J.: Feature Deduction and Ensemble 
Design of Intrusion Detection Systems. Computers and Security 
24(4), 295-307 (2005) 
152 
 
 
87. Mukkamala, S., Sung, A.: Identifying Significant Features for Network 
Forensics Analysis Using Artificial Intelligent Techniques. 
International Journal on Digital Evidence (IJDE) 1(4) (2003) 
88. OpenBSD: PF: The OpenBSD Packet Filter. In: openbsd.org. Available at: 
http://www.openbsd.org/faq/pf 
89. Roesch, M.: Snort -- Lightweight Intrusion Detectin for Networks. In : 13th 
USENIX Conference on System ADministration (LISA '99), pp.229-
238 (1999) 
90. Wireshark Foundation: Wireshark. In: Wireshark. Available at: 
http://www.wireshark.org/ 
91. YouTube, LLC: YouTube. In: YouTube. Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/ 
92. Eastman, P.: Art of Illusion Home. In: Art of Illusion. Available at: 
http://www.artofillusion.org 
93. Negnevitsky, M.: Artificial Intelligence: A Guide to Intelligent Systems. 
Addison Wesley (2002) 
94. O'Gorman, M., Donnenberg, A.: Handbook of Human Immunology. CRC 
Press, Boca Raton, USA (2008) 
95. Parham, P.: The Immune System 3rd edn. Garland Science, London and 
New York (2009) 
96. Nelson, D., Cox, M.: Lehninger Principles of Biochemistry 3rd edn. Worth 
Publishers, New York, USA (2000) 
97. Clark, D., Russell, L.: The Molecular Defense Initiative: Your Immune 
System at Work. In : Molecular Biology Made Simple and Fun. Cache 
River Press, Vienna, USA (1997) 357-381 
98. Hungenberg, T., Echert, M.: INetSim Project Homepage. In: INetSim: 
Internet Services Simulation Suite. (Accessed 2010) Available at: 
http://www.inetsim.org/index.html 
99. Wall, L.: The Perl Programming Language. In: www.perl.org. Available at: 
http://www.perl.org 
100. Python Software Foundation: Python Programming Language -- Official 
153 
 
 
Website. In: Python Programming Language -- Official Website. 
(Accessed 2011) Available at: http://www.python.org 
101. Cruse, J., Lewis, R.: Illustrated Dictionary of Immunology. CRC Press, Boca 
Raton, USA (2009) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
  
  
APPENDIX A, REFERENCE OF VARIABLE NAMES 
Below is a listing of the variable names which are used consistently 
throughout this paper. 
   Alpha.  The training factor. 
      Alpha, size, and time.  The training factor for a certain 
neighborhood time for a certain iteration of training. 
   Delta.  The change in    
      Change, vector, node, index (SOM).  The change in vector 
space for node i. 
     Best Matching Inputs.  A label. 
 BMN Best Matching Node.  A label. 
 d Distance (SOM).  Can be the difference in space between 
two location vectors or can be the neighborhood distance between 
two nodes, depending upon the context. 
       Distance, vector, input, node (SOM).  The distance in space 
between an input vector and a node vector. 
 D Data.  A set of V (vectors) or a matrix, depending upon the 
context.   
    Data, input.  Any of       ,      , or      . 
    Data, nodes (SOM).  A set of the node vectors V of a SOM.  
A matrix D that represents a SOM. 
       Data, real (SOM).  The set of data D that is real input for a 
SOM used in production. 
  
       Data, testing (SOM).  The set of data D that is used for 
testing a SOM. 
        Data, training (SOM).  The set of data D that is used for 
training a SOM. 
 e Element.  A generic element in a set. 
 E Event.  A set of e (elements) derived from a T (transmission 
set). 
 i Index. 
 I Intrusion.  A set of R (records) for an intrusion. 
    Intrusion, Type 1.  A kind of I (intrusion). 
    Intrusion, Type 2.  A kind of I (intrusion). 
    Intrusion, Type 3.  A kind of I (intrusion). 
   
     Intrusion Detection, Type 1.  A function. 
   
     Intrusion Detection, Type 2.  A function. 
   
     Intrusion Detection, Type 3.  A function. 
 L Log.  A set of R (records). 
 m Meta-data.  Items of data about e (elements) in an E (event 
set). 
 M Meta-data.  A set of m (meta-data items) 
    Number, Data.  The number of elements in a Data set. 
    Number, Event.  The number of elements in an Event set. 
    Number, Meta-data.  The number of elements in a Meta-data 
set. 
  
    Number, node.  The number of elements in    (Data, 
Nodes).  The number of nodes in a SOM. 
    Number, Transmission.  The number of objects in a 
Transmission set. 
    Number, Vector.  The number of elements in a Vector set, 
vector, or matrix. 
     Neighborhood.  A label. 
 o Object.  An element of a T (transmission) set. 
 R Record.  A set including elements from both M (meta-data) 
and E (events). 
 t Time (SOM).  A count of the iterations in the training 
 T Transmission.  A set of o (objects) representing a frame or 
packet which is transmitted over a network. 
 V Vector.  An n-tuple of real numbers.  May be perceived as 
being a set, a vector, a matrix, or in other ways depending upon the 
context. 
    Vector, aggregate.  A V (vector) containing aggregate 
information. 
      Vector, Best Matching Node (SOM).  The V (vector) for the 
Best Matching Node. 
    Vector, detail.  A V (vector) containing detail information. 
    Vector, input.  A V (vector) used as input. 
    Vector, node (SOM).  A V (vector) for a node. 
  
      Vector, node, count (SOM).  The number of BMI for a node. 
       Vector, node, index, count (SOM).  The number of BMI for 
node i. 
         Vector, node, neighborhood, size, time (iteration) (SOM).  
The neighborhood for Node i with a neighborhood size of s for 
training iteration t. 
             Vector, node, neighborhood, size, time (iteration), 
count (SOM).  The number of BMI for the neighborhood for Node i 
with a neighborhood size of s for training iteration t. 
               Vector, node, maximum, neighborhood, size, time 
(iteration), count.  The maximum count of MBIs for a neighborhood 
of size s in training iteration t. 
APPENDIX B, CONCEPT LEVELS 
The concept levels in this research are presented in a general ascending 
order beginning with binary code from network transmissions and progressing to 
abstract Soft Computing ideas.  Most concept levels as presented increase the 
abstraction of the data.  Here is a summary of the concept levels discussed in 
this research. 
1. A network transmission of objects. 
2. A set of elements. 
3. A set of meta-data about the set of elements. 
  
4. A set that includes both the elements and meta-data about those 
elements 
5. A collection of sets of meta-data and elements. 
6. A matrix. 
7. A set of matrices. 
8. Generalized n-tuples. 
9. A multidimensional solution space. 
10.   A topological graph. 
11.   A feature map of vector dimensions. 
12.   A feature map, such as landscape features, representing groups 
of vector dimensions. 
13.   Fuzzy inferences from the feature map. 
14.   Crisp output from the fuzzy inferences. 
15.   Individual danger signals. 
16.   Opinions of danger signals. 
17.   Discounted opinions of danger signals 
18.  A fusion of danger signals. 
19.   Antigen as an indicator of an intrusion. 
20.   Antigen as a label which just identifies something. 
21.   A dendritic cell algorithm being a fusion method for intrusion 
detection. 
22.   Snort and SOM outputs as biological inputs to artificial dendritic 
cells. 
  
23.   Artificial dendritic cells indicating danger and safety in network 
traffic. 
24.   A theoretical evolving universal hybridized SOM/FIS/AISDT 
intrusion detection system. 
APPENDIX C, BIOLOGICAL TERMS 
These definitions are generalized for non-biologist readers in order to 
provide enough information to show context for the Artificial Immune System 
Danger Theory.  These definitions are not intended to satisfy strict biological 
requirements.  They are paraphrased from [50], [77], [84], [94], [95], [97], and 
[101].  See immunology texts such as the ones cited for more strict biological 
definitions. 
 Activated: The description of an element of the immune system 
which has successfully found an antigen.  A dendritic cell which has 
reached the threshold to make a decision. 
 Adaptive Immune System:  One of two types of human immunity.  
The adaptive immune system has two parts:  humoral immunity and 
cell-mediated immunity.  The other type of human immunity is 
innate. 
 AIS: Artificial Immune System. 
 AISDT: Artificial Immune System Danger Theory. 
 Antibody: A substance secreted by B-cells in response to an 
antigen. 
  
 Antigen: Something which reacts with antibodies and/or T-cell 
receptors.  Potentially an invader.  Potentially non-self in self/non-
self immunity. 
 Antigen Presenting Cell (APC): A cell which presents antigens on 
its cell boundary where they can interact with T-cells. 
 APC: Antigen Presenting Cell. 
 Apoptosis: Intentional death of an unwanted cell for the good of 
the person. 
 Artificial Immune System: A system of protection based on the 
human immune system. 
 B-Cell: An antibody producing cell in the humoral immune 
system.  The B originally stood for the bursa of Fabricius where it 
matures in birds, but it can also stand for bone marrow where it 
matures in humans. 
 B-Cell Receptor: An antibody which has been retained on the 
cell wall of a B-cell.  Compare with T-cell receptor. 
 B-Lymphocyte: B-cell. 
 Cell-Mediated Immunity: One of two kinds of adaptive immunity.  
Cell-mediated immunity is mediated by T-cells.  The other kind of 
adaptive immunity is humoral immunity. 
 Clonal Selection: The duplication of antibodies after an antibody 
matches with an antigen. 
 Cytokine: A chemical communicator between cells. 
  
 Cytotoxic T-Cell: Killer T-Cell. 
 Danger Context: One of two possible outputs of the Dendritic 
Cell Algorithm (DCA).  A danger context indicates that the immune 
system should be activated.  The other possible output is a safe 
context. 
 Danger Signal: Molecules from stressed or dying cells or 
pathogens. 
 Danger Theory: A theory of the immune system which 
considers indications of danger for triggering the immune system.  
Compare to self/non-self immunity. 
 Dendritic Cell: A professional Antigen Presenting Cell (APC) 
with branched structures that can activate T-cells.  They are mature 
(activated) or immature (non-activated) depending upon whether or 
not they can activate T-cells. [101] 
 Detector Cell: An antibody or T-cell in an AIS.  A detector cell 
has various states:  a semi-mature state while it undergoes 
stochastic sampling; a mature state indicating that it was not 
eliminated for being self; an activated state means that it matches 
an antigen; and, a memory state means that the activated state 
was verified by a human. 
 Effector Cell:  An activated experienced cell, ready to kill 
targets, help B-cells or macrophages, or secrete antibody. 
 Epitope: The part of an antigen which can be matched. 
  
 Experienced T-Cell:  A T-cell that has responded at least 
once to an antigen. 
 Helper T-Cell: A type of T-cell that activates B-cells to make 
more antigen.  Compare with killer T-cell. 
 Humoral Immunity: One of two kinds of adaptive immunity.  
Humoral immunity is extra-cellular in bodily fluids and is mediated 
by antibodies produced by B-cells.  The other kind of adaptive 
immunity is cell-mediated immunity. 
 Immature Dendritic Cell: A dendritic cell which has not made a 
decision.  Compare with semi-mature and mature dendritic cell. 
 Immune System: A system of protection.  The two general types 
of the human immune system are innate, and adaptive. 
 Immunoglobulin: A mature B-cell stimulated by an antigen, such 
as an antibody. 
 Inflammation: An example response of the innate immune 
system involving increased circulation of the blood and other 
activities. 
 Innate Immune System: One of two types of human immunity.  
The innate immune system has a fast non-specific response with 
no memory and is usually short-lived.  The other type of human 
immunity is adaptive. 
 Interferon: A type of cytokine. 
  
 Killer T-Cell: A type of T-Cell that kills an infected or cancerous 
cell.  Compare with Helper T-Cell.  Contrast with Natural Killer Cell. 
 Langerhans Cell: A type of dendritic cell. 
 Lymphocyte:  A B-cell or T-cell. 
 Macrophage: A kind of non-specific phagocyte that interacts with 
both B-cells and T-cells. 
 Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC): A part of a cell wall 
that presents an antigen. 
 Mature B-Cell: A B-cell whose antibody has matched an 
antigen. 
 Mature Dendritic Cell: A dendritic cell with a matching antigen 
and with a danger signal. 
 Mature T-Cell: A T-cell activated by an APC. 
 MHC: Major Histocompatibility Complex. 
 NK: Natural Killer Cell. 
 Natural Killer Cell (NK): A cell in the innate immune system that 
kills tumor cells and certain virus-infected cells, and does not 
require prior contact with antigen.  Contrast with killer T-cell. 
 Neutrophil: A phagocyte in the Innate Immune System that 
ingests and destroys foreign bodies. 
 Non-Self: Chemical compounds which an organism considers to 
be not part of itself. 
 PAMP: Pathogen-Associated Molecular Pattern. 
  
 Pathogen: An agent that can produce disease. 
 Pathogen-Associated Molecule Pattern (PAMP): Motifs of 
molecules that are not found on host tissues. 
 Phagocyte: A cell that ingests particles. 
 Plasma Cell: A mature B-Cell, one whose antibody has matched an 
antigen. 
 Professional Antigen Presenting Cell (APC): A macrophage, B-
cell, or dendritic cell that can activate a T-cell. [101]  Any cell that 
can activate virgin T-cells. 
 Safe Context: One of two possible outputs of the Dendritic 
Cell Algorithm (DCA).  A safe context indicates that the immune 
system should not be activated.  The other possible output is a 
danger context. 
 Safe Signal:  A signal of safe to a dendritic cell. 
 Self: Chemical compounds which an organism considers to be 
part of itself. 
 Self/non-self immunity: An explanation of immunity in which 
non-self entities trigger the immune system.  Compare to Danger 
Theory. 
 Semi-Mature Dendritic Cell: A dendritic cell with a safe 
context. 
 T-Cell: The type of cell which mediates in the cell-mediated 
immune system.  The T is for thymus, where the T-cell matures.  
  
Two types of T-cells are helper T-cells and killer T-cells.  Compare 
with B-cell in the humoral immune system. 
 T-Cell Receptor: The part of the surface of a T-cell which 
matches a presented antigen.  For T-cell receptors, the 
corresponding antigen is a partially consumed antigen which has 
been presented by a phagocyte.  Compare with B-cell receptor. 
 T-Lymphocyte: T-cell. 
 Virgin T-Cell:  A mature T-cell that has not yet met antigen. 
APPENDIX D, KNOWLEDGE ENGINEER DECISIONS 
Below is a summary of decisions that must be made by a knowledge 
engineer in the system described in this research: 
 Deciding the research type goal. 
 The design of the hybridized system. 
 The initial data selection. 
 How to normalize the input data. 
 The SOM size. 
 The original assignment of node vectors for the SOM. 
 What constitutes height in the 3D scheme for the SOM. 
 How danger and safe signals are produced by the SOM. 
 The color scheme for the SOM. 
 The atomicity value for SJ Fusion. 
 How often to start a new artificial dendritic cell. 
  
 What the base weights and threshold are for the Interim DCA 
Formula. 
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